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ABSTRACT
First-year law students soon become familiar with the numerus
clausus principle in property law. The principle holds that there is a
limited menu of available standard property forms (the estates, the
different types of common or joint ownership, the different types of ser-
vitudes) and that new forms are hardly ever introduced. Over the last
fifty years, however, property law has changed dramatically. A wealth
of new property forms has been added to the list. This dynamism in
the list has remained largely unexplored and is the subject of this Arti-
cle. This Article focuses on a selection of recently created property
forms, which share an important quality. They establish mechanisms
of democratic and deliberative governance for resources as diverse as
natural resources, scarce urban land, historic landmarks, or cultural
institutions. The study of these property forms sheds new light on how
the numerus clausus principle works in practice and on why it exists
in the first place. It also discloses a fundamental transformation in
the way we think about the institution of property and the benefits we
may draw from it. We have come to believe that, for some critical re-
sources that involve public interests, use and management decisions
should be made not by a single owner, whether private or public, but
through a process that is democratic and deliberative. This Article ex-
amines sympathetically but critically this aspiration to deliberative
democratic governance in property law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, first-year law students learn that there is a
limited menu of available standard property forms. The menu in-
cludes the “estates” (the fee simple absolute, the defeasible fee
simple, the life estate and the lease), the basic forms of concurrent
interests (tenancy in common, joint tenancy, marital property, trusts,
condominium), and the four types of servitudes (easements, profits,
real covenants and equitable servitudes).1 On the other side of the
Atlantic, their French, Italian or German colleagues also learn that
the menu of property rights is limited, comprised of ownership, em-
phyteusis, superficies, real servitudes, the right of usufruct, the right
of use and the right of habitation.2 The idea that property law recog-
nizes only a limited menu of mandatory forms is known as the
numerus clausus principle.
There is, moreover, a second dimension to the numerus clausus
claim. As the word “clausus” suggests, the list is “closed.” Not only is
the number of forms in the list limited, but the content of the list – the
specific admitted forms – is understood by property lawyers to be sta-
ble. In civil law systems, scholars note that the list has changed little
since Justinian’s time.3 Meanwhile, in the United States, “there are
no significant examples of judicial abolition of existing forms of prop-
erty” and courts generally “have declined to create new ones.”4
This is astonishing when we consider how much property law
has changed over the last fifty years. In the United States, newly ad-
mitted forms include common interest communities, the community
land trust, an expanded public trust ownership and digital servi-
tudes. In Europe, there has also been significant “dynamism” in the
list of property forms.5 Rather than inventing new items for the
numerus clausus, European legislatures have reintroduced previ-
ously eliminated property forms. Some European countries have
revived emphyteusis (long lease), a property form that originated in
late Antiquity. In Italy, a 2007 legislative proposal seeks to re-intro-
duce a long-forgotten Roman law property form, “ownership of
common goods.”
1. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 12-17 (2000) (dis-
cussing the full menu of property forms in U.S. law).
2. BRAM AKKERMANS, THE PRINCIPLE OF Numerus Clausus in European Property
Law 19-80 (2008) (tracing the history of the numerus clausus principle from Pre-
Classical Roman law to the French Code Napoleon and discussing the seven classical
civil law property forms).
3. Id., at 19-80 (showing the stability of the classical seven civil law property
forms from Roman law to the modern ninteenth century codes).
4. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 20.
5. I borrow the term “dynamism” to describe changes in the list from Nestor M.
Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597,
1610 (2008) (discussing the idea of dynamism in standardization).
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The dynamism in the list of standard property forms has re-
mained largely unexplored, and is the subject of this Article which
focuses on a number of property forms that have been added to the
standard list in relatively recent times. These forms are by no means
the only new additions to the list, but they share a crucial character-
istic. To varying degrees, they each establish mechanisms of
democratic and deliberative governance for resources as diverse as
natural resources, scarce urban land, historic landmarks, or cultural
institutions. Homeowners in a “common interest community” can
participate in designing and governing the space where they live by
collectively imposing restraints on the alienation of individual units,
architectural restrictions, and use restrictions. Similarly, a “commu-
nity land trust” allows residents who have invested in the
revitalization of a depressed neighborhood to collectively retain con-
trol over its development, keeping homes affordable. Additionally,
through an expansive interpretation of the public trust doctrine, U.S.
courts have designed a special form of ownership for natural re-
sources, democratizing both access to and governance of all water
suitable for recreation purposes, groundwater, and beaches. Finally,
the new digital property servitudes enable individuals and communi-
ties to figure out on their own how to bypass the strictures of
intellectual property law and secure access to creative works. In Eu-
rope, emphyteusis makes the land use planning process more
democratic by allowing all affected parties to participate in establish-
ing conditions and restrictions on the use of land. Similarly,
“ownership of common goods” aims at democratizing the governance
of resources that are essential to fundamental rights (housing, re-
sources of cultural or historic significance) or that may implicate
interests of future generations (water, natural resources).
The study of these property forms sheds new light on how the
numerus clausus principle works in practice and why it exists in the
first place. It also reveals an important transformation in the way we
think about private property and the benefits we may draw from it.
Specifically, this Article supports an account of contemporary prop-
erty law that is rooted in democratic values.6 Democratic property
theory has emerged as a viable alternative to law & economics, effi-
ciency-focused property accounts. This Article expands existing
democratic accounts of property at a descriptive as well as at a nor-
mative level.
6. A democratic theory of property law has been proposed by Joseph W. Singer,
Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1009 (2008-2009) [hereinafter Singer, Democratic Estates]; id., Property as the
Law of Democracy (on file with author); see also, generally, Avihay Dorfman, Property
and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L. J.
467 (2011) (outlining the main themes of a democratic legitimation for property
rights).
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Descriptively, the study of these new additions to the inventory
of recognized property forms suggests that important developments
in both U.S. and European property law embody the commitment to
democratic values. The numerus clausus principle operates as a flexi-
ble constraint that allows for significant experimentalism in property
law. The reason for this constraint on property experimentalism is
rooted in a democratic conception of the content of property forms, as
well as of the process through which they are generated. As others
have noted, because property rights have an inherent public quality
(i.e., they impose duties on all non-owners), we want them to embody
democratic values we collectively approve of. Additionally, we want
property forms to be generated through a democratic process. New
property forms have to pass muster with democratically elected legis-
latures.7 Expanding on existing democratic accounts of property, this
Article shows yet a deeper democratic layer of the process by which
new forms are added to the standard list. It is not always the case, as
many suggest, that new property forms are generated by market ac-
tors seeking their own economic self-interest and subsequently
ratified by legislatures.8 Rather, it is often the case that citizens mo-
tivated by public values generate new forms that are then approved
by the legislature. In other words, civil society’s democratic creativity
plays an important, and largely overlooked, role in the evolution of
property law.
Further, at a normative level, the addition of these new property
forms suggests that there is something new and appealing in the
multitude of clashing normative ideals we seek to pursue through
property in contemporary liberal democracies.9 The property forms
discussed in this Article reflect an emerging aspiration to delibera-
tive democracy. They suggest that decisions concerning the use and
management of resources that implicate fundamental public inter-
7. On the democratic justification for the numerus clausus principle, see Dorf-
man, supra note 6, at 490 (discussing the “public” and fundamentally relational
nature of property rights as “the authority to fix the normative standing of others in
relation to an object”) and at 503 (arguing that property forms must pass muster of
democratically elected legislatures to be truly “co-authored” and “self-given”); Singer,
Democratic Estates, supra note 6, at 1048 (discussing the estates system and arguing
that “whether the [property] relationship is legitimate depends on a moral judgment
that the relationship is acceptable in a free and democratic society [. . .]. In a free and
democratic society, some relationships are out of bounds.”); see also Hanoch Dagan,
The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1566-1567 (2003) (arguing that the
numerus clausus principle shapes our social values and that “limiting the number of
property forms and standardizing their content facilitates the roles of property in con-
solidating expectations and expressing ideal forms of relationship”).
8. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in
Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (2008) (arguing that “private prop-
erty owners work to maximize property value as a function of three dimensions
through contract”).
9. Davidson, supra note 5, at 1639 (“[I]t is clear that a multitude of clashing
normative precepts find voice in the forms.”).
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ests should be made not by a single owner, whether private or public,
but through a deliberative-democratic process in which all affected
parties participate as equals and give one another reasons that are
mutually acceptable.
The idea that property regimes should foster democratic and de-
liberative decision-making has been largely overlooked by democratic
property theory. It draws from and expands on two existing, and at
times seemingly contradictory, ideas about the benefits of property as
a device for managing resources. A rich strand of thought, from Adam
Smith to the law and economics movement, argues that property fa-
cilitates the efficient and productive use of resources by encouraging
individual owners’ decision-making and bargaining.10 A parallel
strand of “civic republican property theory”11 emphasizes that the
core purpose of property is to fulfill some prior normative vision
about how the social order should be structured.12 The emerging com-
mitment to deliberative democracy in property mediates between
these two visions. It suggests that, in the liberal-democratic social
order, resources that implicate public interests should be governed
through processes that are inclusive and focused on reason-giving.
For these resources, only deliberative democratic governance
processes will produce use and management decisions that are both
efficient and just.
Drawing on democratic theory, this Article examines, sympathet-
ically but critically, the aspiration to democratic deliberative
governance in property. Ideally, property forms that establish demo-
cratic deliberative governance mechanisms yield decisions that are
more informed, more inclusive, because they reflect a wider range of
views, and more legitimate, because adopted after extensive reason-
giving. But deliberative democracy is a controversial and ambitious
idea. This Article addresses some of the objections that may be lev-
eled against deliberative property forms. For some, deliberative
democracy sacrifices substantively desirable or just outcomes for the
sake of inclusive, deliberative, or otherwise fair processes. Others
note that deliberative democracy is a revolutionary political ideal,
one requiring dramatic changes in political institutions, both in the
bases of collective decision-making and also in the distribution of re-
sources. These critics question whether deliberative democratic
property forms uphold their promise under non-ideal, real-world cir-
cumstances. For instance, deliberative democratic property forms
may not be feasible due to the sheer number of affected parties that
need consultation and/or their lack of expertise. Further, deliberative
democracy in property may be unrealistic because it is premised on
10. On this strand of thought, see infra 31 and accompanying footnotes.
11. Id.
12. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 2 (1997).
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an illusory assumption that participants will be able and willing to
transcend their narrow self-interests and starting preferences. Fi-
nally, deliberative democratic property forms may simply mirror the
existing distribution of power. They may fail to involve, if not actually
exclude, potential participants, including those least able to partici-
pate on account of resources or education, those marginalized on
account of race, gender, or sexuality, or those with ideologically radi-
cal views.
This Article is structured in two Parts. Part I surveys the demo-
cratic deliberative property forms. Part II draws the implications of
the addition of these new property forms. Part II.A discusses how the
development of these forms illuminates the justification and the ac-
tual operation of the numerus clausus principle. Part II.B examines
and responds to the possible theoretical and practical objections to
deliberative democratic property forms.
I. THE NEW “DELIBERATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC” PROPERTY FORMS
This part surveys six new, or relatively recent, property forms.
These forms have either been added to the list of standard property
forms or are currently being discussed by legislatures. The scope of
the survey is not limited to the United States; it extends to European
civil law countries. These additions are not the only instances of
change in the list. For example, think of the changes in the area of
landlord and tenant law that occurred in the United States starting
in the 1960s. Courts significantly altered the rights and duties aris-
ing from a residential lease to ensure greater social and economic
security for weaker parties.13 Or think of the addition of a new prop-
erty form, the Anwartschaftsrechte (“acquisition right”), in German
law or the fiducie (a trust-like device) in French law.14 Both seek to
promote greater flexibility in economic transactions by expanding
owners’ ability to plan and control the use of their property.
The six forms discussed in this Article are distinctive because
they seek to promote deliberative and democratic decision-making by
the multiple actors affected by the use of resources that implicate
public values and collective interests. These resources include scarce
urban land, housing, water, historic landmarks or cultural
institutions.
13. For a discussion of the changes in landlord and tenant law, see JOSEPH W.
SINGER, PROPERTY 435-90 (3d ed. 2009).
14. AKKERMANS, supra note 2, at 217, 248.
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A. Common Interest Communities
Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that the principle of as-
sociation shapes American society.15 Americans have long believed
that vita activa, participation in self-governance, is the cornerstone of
a healthy community.16 In the American imagination, the town meet-
ing best captures this belief in the benefits of active participation in
self-governance.17 In U.S. property law, the image of the town meet-
ing is most closely associated with common-interest communities, a
1960s addition to the list of standard U.S. property forms. Common-
interest communities (CICs) are residential communities that are
created by “stacking” covenants containing a variety of restrictions on
residents’ use of their property. The restrictions may vary widely and
may concern anything from restraints on alienation of the individual
units, to aesthetics and architecture, to “no pets” clauses, to the fam-
ily status of resident members.18 What defines CICs is the
homeowners association’s power to enforce existing restrictions and
adopt new ones, as well as to assess and collect fees.19
CICs emerged as popular attitudes about development and ideal
living arrangements changed in the mid-twentieth century.20 Earlier
development patterns, most notably the spread of the suburban sin-
gle-family detached house had facilitated the crumbling of
Americans’ communal ties. By the 1960s, a new romance of commu-
nity life encouraged developers to advertise homes in CICs as “pieces
of ready-made communities.” A passage from a 1975 Florida court
decision describing a CIC as “a little democratic sub society” has been
widely quoted in subsequent case law.21 More recently, in a 2007 de-
cision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the special social
15. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128-29 (Schocken ed.
1961), quoted in Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989-1990) (discussing the
importance of community and participation in our national character and the funda-
mental normative questions it poses).
16. Id.
17. David C. Drewes, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest Commu-
nities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 314, 315 (2001) (arguing that when Americans think of community they think of
the town meeting and that the notion that citizens should be actively engaged in civic
and political affairs has prevailed throughout most of American history).
18. SINGER, supra note 13, at 367 (discussing the legal structure of common inter-
est communities).
19. Id. See also Drewes, supra note 17, at 316 (“The unique characteristic that
separates CICs from other servitude-bound property is that these communities en-
force their covenants and govern themselves through a community association”).
20. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 7-12 (discussing two visions of residential
life: the nineteenth century vision which idealizes residential life outside the city in
single family dwellings and the search for “community” which emerges in the mid-
twentieth century and emphasizes shared values and connectedness).
21. Hidden Harbour Estates Inc. v. Norman, 309 So.2d 180 (Fla Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
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fabric of CICs and their role as centers of civic engagement.22 In the
Twin Rivers case, the court concluded that a CIC’s restrictions on
posting of signs and use of community rooms was neither the exclu-
sive province of private contract law nor the free speech guarantees of
the New Jersey constitution reserved for constitutional actors.
Rather, the court emphasized that homeowners associations play an
important role in the civic life of New Jersey and thereby created a
new constitutional standard.23
Whether CICs are actual laboratories of self-governance is a
matter of debate among property scholars.24 Critics contend that the
aspiration to participatory democracy within CICs evoked by court
decisions is often illusory.25 The deferential legal treatment that
these CICs have received from courts has resulted in “the establish-
ment of a stultifying culture of top-down decision-making within CIC
which is anathema to “community.”26 Critics point to several reasons
why the existing legal regime of CICs frustrates the goal of participa-
tion in self-governance.
First, they suggest that CICs are often creatures of coercion,
dominated by the developer’s control, rather than voluntary associa-
tions.27 Courts and scholars have largely viewed CICs as voluntary
associations created by private agreements.28 Accordingly, they have
argued that courts’ review of the association’s “constitution,” i.e., the
restrictive covenants contained in members’ deeds or in the “declara-
tion” recorded in the registry of deeds, should be minimally intrusive.
The result is a hands-off judicial policy, whereby restrictions are re-
22. Comm. For a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A 2d
1060 (N.J. 2007). For an analysis of the case, see generally Paula A. Franzese &
Steven Siegel, The Twin Rivers Case: Of Homeowners Associations, Free Speech
Rights and Privatized Mini-Governments, 5 RUTGERS J. OF L. & PUB. POL. 729 (2008).
23. Franzese & Siegel, supra note 22, at 748, 750.
24. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 43-47 (arguing that the vision of par-
ticipatory democracy within CICs is often illusory and analyzing the factors that
undermine participation); Drewes, supra note 17, at 333-38 (arguing that the current
legal regime of CICs has contributed to the establishment of a stultifying corporate
culture of top-down decision making that undermines participation); Paula A.
Franzese, Does it Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the
Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 560 (2002) (suggesting that the patterns
of regimentation that accompany CIC living promote cultures that do more to destroy
community than to build it) and at 588 (arguing that traditional common interest
communities overemphasize restrictive covenants as well as control and compliance
to the detriment of social networks and participation); Ross Thomas, Ungating Subur-
bia: Property Rights, Political Participation and Common Interest Communities, 22
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 (2012) (arguing that the homogenous character of
CICs results in the deterioration of the quality of public debate and of the quality of
American citizenship more generally).
25. Alexander, supra note 15, at 43.
26. Drewes, supra note 17, at 314.
27. Id. at 325; Alexander, supra note 15, at 44.
28. On the private and voluntary nature of CICs, see generally Robert C. Ellick-
son, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Richard A.
Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988).
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viewed for reasonableness, and courts are reluctant to strike down
restrictions as “unreasonable.”29 But, critics argue, the reality is
quite different. The idea that members/buyers have consented to a
“constitution” is an overstatement. The various contractual patholo-
gies that affect other kinds of covenants are no less present in the
context of CICs.30 Buyers tend to ignore or insufficiently review re-
strictions. Further, they often fail to accurately assess what their
preferences will be in the future. The coercive, rather than delibera-
tive and democratic, nature of the CICs is further reinforced by the
fact that such “constitutions” tend to be overly restrictive and diffi-
cult to amend.31 The deferential “reasonableness” standard applied
by courts has encouraged developers to draft highly restrictive consti-
tutions in order to secure a greater return on their investment. If the
constitution prohibits ex ante as many uses as possible that prospec-
tive buyers may want to avoid, buyers will be apt to pay more for the
units.32
Second, critics note that the governing structure of CICs, far
from being democratic and deliberative, is a top-down structure that
most closely resembles a corporate management model.33 In buying
into a CIC, residents tend to hand over the reins to a board of direc-
tors, which serves as a unitary locus of power with broad authority to
enforce existing restrictions and create new ones.34 Empirical studies
suggest that this top-down governance structure discourages partici-
pation and results in apathy, alienation, and frustration on the part
of residents.35 An additional factor hampering participatory democ-
racy in CICs is the fact that voting rights are reserved to owners.36
This practice, critics note, “disenfranchises renting residents and en-
hances the power of non-resident owners who own more than one
unit in the development.”37
In recent years, a wealth of property writing has focused on how
to realize CICs’ promise of deliberative democracy. Some propose that
judges conduct a more vigorous procedural review of the rules en-
acted by the homeowners’ association.38 Currently, courts subject
these rules to a substantive reasonableness standard, but are reluc-
tant to find them unreasonable. The above-mentioned proposal would
alter this standard, and focus on how a rule was adopted. If the gov-
29. Drewes, supra note 17, at 327-28.
30. Gregory S. Alexander, The Publicness of Private Land Use Controls, 3 EDIN-
BURGH L. REV. 176, 180 (1999); Drewes, supra note 17, at 326.
31. Drewes, supra note 17, at 328-29.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 335-36.
34. Id. at 333.
35. Alexander, supra note 15, at 43; Drewes, supra note 17, at 334.
36. Alexander, supra note 15, at 45.
37. Id.
38. Drewes, supra note 17, at 338-41.
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erning board acted as “facilitators of deliberation” and the process by
which the rule was adopted included the participation of the associa-
tion’s membership, judges would be more willing to find the rule
reasonable.39 By contrast, if a restriction was passed without much
effort to elicit members’ participation and the decision was made
without much deliberation, the court would be inclined to find the
rule unreasonable.40 Similarly, others suggest incorporating the
“right to heterogeneous communities” into the current reasonable-
ness standard of review. In reviewing the reasonableness of an
association’s rule, courts should focus on the fundamental right to
live in “heterogeneous laboratories of democracy.”41
Still others suggest that a first step in the task of revitalizing the
participatory and democratic nature of CICs is to turn to the guide-
lines contained in the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes.42 For
example, to preclude developers from protracted despotic control over
rules and bylaws, the Restatement suggests that developers turn con-
trol over to the community association “after the time reasonably
necessary to protect their interests in completing and marketing the
project.”43 Furthermore, the Restatement counters the current ten-
dency to adopt overly restrictive rules by limiting associations’
powers to regulate conduct inside given units to rules aimed at curb-
ing nuisance-like activities that interfere with other owners’ use and
enjoyment.44 Finally, CICs’ “constitutions” should liberalize the
amendment process45 and encourage residents’ involvement by, for
example, making participation on an association’s committee as
mandatory as payment of fees.46
B. The Community Land Trust
The Community Land Trust (CLT) is a property form developed in
the 1970s as a response to the need for affordable housing and
39. Id. at 339.
40. Id. at 339.
41. Thomas, supra note 24, at 233-34 (Thomas argues, at 229, that the current
reasonableness standard is insufficient in two respects: a) the concept of reasonable-
ness is subject to substantial disagreements; b) unless reasonableness implies an
external community standard, courts will uphold most rules as reasonable for the
purpose of the internal community; Thomas suggests that the value that is missing
from current solutions to the CICs dilemmas is “meaningful political participation.”
Thomas focuses on the federalist concept of “laboratories of democracy” but empha-
sizes the need for diversity and inclusion).
42. Franzese, supra note 24, at 591; see also Paula A. Franzese, Building Commu-
nity in Common Interest Communities: The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of
Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 17, 30-43 (2003-2004).
43. Franzese, supra note 24, at 591.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 592.
46. Drewes, supra note 17, at 340.
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greater democratic community control.47 The CLT “combines a new
approach to the ownership of land and housing with a new approach
to the democratic stewardship of this property.”48 A CLT is a non-
profit community housing development organization that acquires
land through donation or purchase, with the intention of holding title
in perpetuity, thereby removing land from the open market. CLTs
vary in structure and organization, but share four key features: land
ownership, ground leases, resale restrictions, and democratic govern-
ance.49 The CLT retains title to the land, but sells buildings to
qualified buyers. Buyers own the building or apartment outright and
lease the ground beneath it from the CLT for a renewable term of
ninety-nine years. The lease may be transferred, assigned and de-
vised to one’s heirs. Hence, scholars describe the CLT as “a lease in
fee,” a fee simple “subject only to the payment of rents reserved.”50
When leaseholders sell their buildings and terminate their ground
leases, the CLT retains a fixed-price preemptive right enabling it to
buy the building at the owner’s original cost with adjustments for in-
flation, improvements, or depreciation. This preemptive right
ensures that the CLT will be able to buy back the building and keep
the cost of housing low for low-income buyers.51
Since its origins in the 1970s, the CLT has embodied an aspiration to
democratic governance. In the words of John Emmeus Davis, a
scholar and activist involved in the development of CLTs since the
early 1980s, the CLT remains “faithful to the democratic precepts
that were ubiquitous among non-profit organizations that develop
low-cost housing or re-develop low-income communities.”52 The roots
of the CLT’s commitment to democratic governance, its open mem-
bership and governing board on which many interests are
represented, date back to the civil rights movement.53 The first CLT
47. Matthew Towey, The Land Trust Without Land: The Unusual Structure of the
Chicago Community Land Trust, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 335, 338-
41 (2008-2009) (discussing the origins of the CLT and the affordability challenge in
the wake of the financial crisis with a particular focus on Chicago).
48. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, STARTING A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST: ORGANIZATIONAL
AND OPERATIONAL CHOICES 1 (2007), available at http://www.burlingtonassociates
.com/clt-resources/starting-a-clt-organizational-and-operational-choices/.
49. Towey, supra note 47, at 342.
50. Christopher A. Seeger, The Fixed-Price Preemptive Right in the Community
Land Trust Lease: A Valid Response to the Housing Crisis or an Invalid Restraint on
Alienation?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 471, 475 (1989-1990).
51. Id. at 475-76.
52. JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, A PRIMER ON MEMBERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR COMMU-
NITY LAND TRUSTS, http://www.burlingtonassociates.com/files/5113/4461/5453/4-A_Pri
mer_on_Membership_Development.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
53. On the origins of the CLT’s democratic impulse and the civil rights movement,
see Sarah Ilene Stein, Wake Up Fannie, I think I got Something to Say to You: Financ-
ing Community Land Trust Homebuyers Without Stripping Affordability Provisions,
60 EMORY L.J. 209, 215 (2010-2011); Towey, supra note 47, at 341; see also Interview
of John Emmeus Davis, Cofounder of Burlington Associates in Community Develop-
ment and Dean for the National CLT Academy, available at http://www.burlingtonas
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was established in rural Georgia in the late 1960s. It acquired 5,000
acres of land, which were then held in trust for the perpetual use of
rural farmers. Among the leaders of the first CLT was Slater King, a
first cousin of Martin Luther King.54
Open membership is a classic characteristic of the CLT. The statu-
tory definition states that the CLT has “membership that is open to
any adult resident of a particular geographical area and specified in
the bylaws of the organization.” CLT experts emphasize that open
membership development is crucial to the success of a CLT, since it
ensures that the CLT remains faithful to its mission. Members must
approve any sale of the CLT land and any amendment to the bylaws.
Specifically, members must approve any amendment to the fixed-
price resale formula. Thus, democratic governance helps the CLT re-
sist short-term pressures and temptations that can compromise the
organization’s long-term commitment to stewarding land.
CLTs usually draw their membership from a number of constituen-
cies. Typically, CLTs give automatic membership to anyone living on
the land leased from the CLT, whether homeowners or tenants.55 But
experts note that, for a CLT to be successful in revitalizing a run-
down neighborhood, two other constituencies are crucial:
homeowners not living on CLT land, and tenants not living on CLT
land.56 Experts reason that, in a gentrifying neighborhood where
housing prices are soaring, support from non-CLT homeowners and
renters is crucial to ensure that the CLT is successful in moderating
speculation and preserving access to homeownership.”57 Non-profit
organizations serving the same population as the CLT, and govern-
ment agencies to whom the CLT must look for funding and regulatory
approvals, are also usually represented in the CLT membership.58
The CLT governance structure further reflects the commitment to de-
mocracy and deliberation. Members elect a board of directors.
Typically, the CLT’s bylaws require the board to represent three dis-
tinct groups: homeowners who lease land from the CLT; local
residents who do not own CLT homes and local government officials;
and funders and developers “who are presumed to speak for the pub-
lic interest.”59 Alongside the board, a number of committees are
charged with special tasks, including an outreach and publicity com-
mittee, a fundraising committee, and a leaseholder services
sociates.com/files/3013/4461/1910/8-John_Emmeus_Davis_Interview-_Democracy_
Collaborative.pdf at 4.
54. Interview with John Emmeus Davis, supra note 53, at 4.
55. Davis, supra note 52, at 3.
56. Id. at 3
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Towey, supra note 47, at 344.
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committee. These committees include individuals who do not serve on
the board, as well as those who do.60
The deliberative and democratic features of the CLT are often criti-
cized as inefficient. Democracy, critics argue, is “a little too messy,”
“slows things down,” and “gets in the way.”61 But in the CLT move-
ment, many believe that there are practical, moral, and political
reasons for preserving and defending the democratic governance
structure that characterizes the classical CLT model.62
C. The Public Trust Doctrine
Through a continuously evolving interpretation of the public
trust doctrine, U.S. courts have designed a form of ownership specific
to certain natural resources.63 This form accommodates private prop-
erty and public concerns through continuous state supervision of
trust resources, regardless of whether they are in public or private
hands.64 The public trust doctrine is a democratizing force in natural
resources law, granting public access both to resources and to the de-
cision making processes concerning these resources.65
The scope of the public trust doctrine was originally defined in a
number of nineteenth century cases, including, most famously, in Illi-
nois Central Railroad Co v. State of Illinois.66 In 1896, the Illinois
legislature had granted an extensive tract of submerged land of incal-
culable value underlying Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central
Railroad Company. Later, the legislature, regretting its generosity,
repealed the grant and brought an action to have the 1869 grant de-
60. Davis, supra note 52, at 7.
61. Interview with John Emmeus Davis, supra note 53, at 11.
62. Id.
63. Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Ac-
commodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 651 (2009-2010) (suggesting that
the public trust doctrine alters the shape of the owner’s bundle of sticks, by limiting
one stick, development rights).
64. Id. at 650.
65. Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. J. 573, 580 (1988-
1989) (arguing that the various types of remedies courts prescribe for trust violations
have an overarching theme, public access, either to the trust resources themselves or
to decision makers with authority to allocate trust property and that this theme
makes the doctrine a democratizing force, preventing monopolization of trust re-
sources and promoting natural resource decision making that involves and is
accountable to the public). See also Marc R. Poirier, Modified Private Property: New
Jersey’s Public Trust Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion and Shared Public
Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 71, 109 (2006) (explaining
that environmental justice advocates now focus on both substantive and procedural
remedies, realizing that “the management of natural resources is subject to an ongo-
ing process of revision, all stakeholders must be given access to decision-making
processes in order to have a better shot at appropriately nondiscriminatory and dis-
tributively fair substantive results).
66. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For an extensive discussion of the case, see Joseph L.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489-91 (1969-1970).
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clared invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the state’s claim and
stated that title to the land underlying navigable waters is “a title
held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navi-
gation of the waters, carry on commerce over them and have liberty of
fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private
parties.”67 Since the Illinois Central Railroad case, courts have
broadened the scope of the doctrine, including more resources within
its sweep and expanding its purposes.68 The public trust doctrine has
been extended to non-navigable waters affecting navigable waters, to
all waters suitable for recreation, and to groundwater and dry sand
beaches. The purpose of the doctrine has extended beyond the origi-
nal purposes of navigation and fishing to include recreation and
ecological preservation.69
Not only have courts expanded the resources to which the public
trust doctrine applies and the purposes it serves, they have also
broadened the remedies prescribed for trust violations. Natural re-
sources scholars note that these remedies possess the unifying theme
of the democratizing natural resources law.70 The public trust doc-
trine, they argue, operates to promote public access to trust resources
and participatory deliberation in the decision-making processes
where use and management policies are adopted.71
The public easement is the most familiar remedy associated with
the public trust doctrine.72 Courts have long interpreted the doctrine
to impose an easement of public access to trust resources. In the ear-
liest U.S. public trust case, Arnold v. Mundy, the court held that a
riparian owner who had planted oysters in a tidal reach of a river had
no trespass claim against the defendant who harvested the oysters.
The outcome of the case granted the public an easement of access to
the beds of tidal waters. The beach cases illustrate most vividly
where the public trust doctrine grants an easement of public access.
In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the public had a right of access to dry sand
areas owned by a non-profit corporation. The court reasoned that
ownership of land flowed by tidal waters is vested in the state in trust
for the people. The court also found that “ancillary to the public’s
right to enjoy the tidal lands, the public has a right to gain access
through and to use the dry sand area not owned by a municipality
but by a quasi-public body.”73
67. 146 U.S. 387 (1982).
68. Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine, A Twenty-First Century Con-
cept, 16 HASTINGS W-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 106-07 (2010).
69. Id.
70. Blumm, supra note 65, at 580.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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Scholars have emphasized another avenue to democratization
implicit in the easement of public access: addressing discrimina-
tion.74 The theme of discrimination underlies many New Jersey
beach cases. Most New Jersey beach cases involve a conflict between
a public (town residents) and another public (everyone else). The ex-
clusion is explicitly based on local residency, which correlates with
race and wealth. In Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-
the-Sea, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a municipality
could not charge non-residents higher fees than residents to use the
beach.75 By insisting on the general public’s right of beach access, the
court sought to undermine divisive and discriminatory social
activism.76
A second, less familiar remedy for trust violations focuses on se-
curing access to decision-making processes. Joseph Sax’s 1970 article,
which revived the public trust doctrine, characterized the doctrine as
a tool for perfecting the political and administrative processes in
which decisions concerning the use, allocation, and preservation of
trust resources are made.77 In particular, Sax focused on what he
called “low visibility” decisions.78 Decisions are often made by admin-
istrative agencies or by private parties to whom the state has
delegated control of the trust resource. These decisions, Sax noted,
are invisible in that they are made without notice that might inform
and energize the general public whose interests these decisions may
affect. Sax proposed redressing a process defect through a process
remedy. For example, the requirement of explicit administrative au-
thorization for transfers of trust resources would put the public on
notice, allowing the public to organize and exert political pressure to
safeguard the resource.79 In recent decades, the question of access to
decision-making processes has received a great deal of attention. En-
vironmental law experts have put the question of community
disenfranchisement in environmental decisions front and center.
Communities are where the environment and human health are inex-
74. Poirier, supra note 65, at 105.
75. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)
76. Poirier, supra note 65, at 106.
77. Sax, supra note 66, at 496-502, (discussing low visibility decisions); for a com-
mentary that emphasizes the process and democratization theme in Sax’ article, see
William Araiza, Democracy, Distrust and the Public Trust: Process-based Constitu-
tional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385 (1997).
78. Sax, supra note 66, at 496-502.
79. Sax, supra note 66, at 496-97 (discussing the Massachusetts response to the
problem of low-visibility policy decisions, and noting that “by a simple but ingenious
flick of the doctrinal wrist, the court has forced agencies to bear the burden of ob-
taining specific, overt approval of efforts to invade the public trust”).
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tricably intertwined, yet communities and their residents are the
least involved in decision-making.80
Courts have made progress in developing process remedies for
trust violations. In particular, courts have relied on the administra-
tive law “hard look” doctrine.81 Under the “hard look” doctrine, a
reviewing court must intervene when the agency “has not really
taken a hard look at the salient problems, and has not genuinely en-
gaged in reasoned decision-making.”82 Courts have relied on the
“hard look” doctrine to require agencies to offer detailed explanations
of their decisions and to allow a broad range of affected interests to
participate effectively in the regulatory process. The result has been
judicial emphasis on fair and participatory processes rather than on
particular substantive results.83 For example, in Kootenai Environ-
mental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, the Supreme Court of
Idaho held that decisions regarding the transfer or use of a trust re-
source may only be taken through open and visible processes, “where
the public is in fact informed of the proposed action and has substan-
tial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before a final
decision is made thereon.”84
D. The New Digital Servitudes
New personal property servitudes developed in the context of
digital property are arguably the most recent innovation in the list of
property forms.85 In some instances, they demonstrate some of the
democratic and participatory features of the property forms discussed
above.
Personal property servitudes are not new, and courts have occa-
sionally enforced them. In 1955 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
enforced an equitable servitude on a jukebox. The servitude imposed
a rent payment of sixty percent of the receipts, prohibited removal of
the jukebox, required it to be operated, and prohibited installation of
80. Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environ-
mental Decisions: Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 37,
39-44 (1998) (discussing the disconnection between residents and environmental deci-
sions); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 17-28 (1998) (discussing three models of
environmental decision making: the ideal of expertise and the traditional administra-
tive system, the idea of pluralism and the modern administrative system and the
ideal of modern civic republicanism and the proposed administrative system).
81. Blumm, supra note 65, at 590; Poirier, supra note 65, at 109.
82. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
83. Blumm, supra note 72, at 590.
84. Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club 671 P.2d 1085
(Idaho 1983).
85. Davidson, supra note 5, at 1611 n.62; on the new servitudes, see generally
Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004); Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L. J. 885 (2007-2008).
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any similar equipment during the period of the lease. The agreement
made the servitude binding on the parties’ successors and assign-
ees.86 Commentators observe that, as the jukebox example suggests,
there may be business reasons for enforcing personal property servi-
tudes.87 Contractual restrictions on the distribution of goods are a
business strategy that allows vendors to control how their products
are priced and marketed.88 Courts, however, have traditionally
viewed personal property servitudes with skepticism,89 because they
make property transactions that could otherwise be frequent, simple,
and fast more information-intensive and time-consuming.90
Despite this skepticism, in recent decades, personal property ser-
vitudes have acquired new salience in the field of digital property.91
For example, purchasers of computer programs and digital music are
asked to agree to licenses that limit how they, and anyone who uses
the software, may use the product.92 In some cases, these digital
property servitudes are justified by the same business reasons that
induced the jukebox vendor to impose use restrictions. Through the
digital property servitudes, developers of computer programs and
digital products impose restrictions on the reproduction of the prod-
uct, the redistribution of the original copy, the possibility of reverse-
engineering the object code, etc.93 But in other cases, the new servi-
tudes reflect a commitment to democratic access and deliberation
similar to the one we have seen in land use and natural resources
law.
The Creative Commons licensing platform is an excellent exam-
ple. The Creative Commons movement seeks to promote
86. Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955); for a discussion of the case, see
Robinson, supra note 85, at 1451.
87. Zechariah Chafee Jr, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes
and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1258 (1956); Robinson, supra note 91, at 1452
(“My purpose here is merely to establish that personal property servitudes, while ex-
ceptional, do still appear in the law and can serve legitimate purposes in commercial
transactions just as Chafee originally surmised they might”).
88. Robinson, supra note 85, at 1452.
89. Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 85, at 914-16 (discussing the reasons for
courts’ skepticism and identifying three sets of reasons: 1) concerns related to notice
and information costs; 2) concerns about dead-hand control and the “problem of the
future” and 3) concerns about harmful externalities).
90. Id. at 915 (arguing that slowing down the process of transferring personal
property by imposing restrictions that require time and effort to understand and ac-
count for is more problematic than clogging up land transfers. The difference, Van
Houweling argues, is relative transaction costs: but for the complications caused by
running restrictions, chattels would be liquid flowing easily to their highest value
use).
91. See generally Robinson, supra note 84; Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 84.
92. A typical example of the new servitudes is the license presented to anyone
who downloads a copy of Microsoft’s Office program, prompting the recipient to click
“I agree” to a number of restrictions, before the software installs; see Shaffer Van
Houweling, supra note 84, at 889 and 931.
93. Id. at 930.
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participatory creation and innovation by offering a licensing platform
that works like a servitude. Authors make their creative works avail-
able to the public for many uses that copyright law would otherwise
forbid, but they also impose restrictions. Authors can authorize use
by choosing from a menu of standardized terms: they can require at-
tribution, i.e., credit to the author; they can authorize all uses for
non-commercial purposes; they may authorize the use of verbatim
copies and prohibit the creation of derivatives; or they may require
the creators of derivative works to subject subsequent users of their
derivatives to the same license that governs the original.94
Underlying the Creative Commons license is the desire to use
servitudes to promote democratic access to a resource that is funda-
mental to human flourishing: ideas and creative works. Ideas and
intellectual creations are in many respects similar to natural re-
sources and the environment.95 For both, democratic access and
participatory governance are critical. As one scholar noted, “concern
with the public’s ability to build upon a body of intellectual works
that are freely available as raw material for new generations of crea-
tivity and innovation echoes environmentalists’ concern with the
public’s ability to enjoy healthy air, water, and open spaces.”96
Property rights are usually associated with the idea of exclu-
sion.97 Increasingly protectionist intellectual property rights limit
access to creative resources. Legislation seems to offer no remedy,
since the legislative process is captured by the content industry that
has an interest in controlling access to ideas. The Creative Commons
licensing platform challenges the property/exclusion intuition by us-
ing a property form, a servitude, to promote participatory self-
governance and democratic access. The license/servitude seeks to al-
low a community of authors to voluntarily undertake a self-
governance project. It enables “individuals and communities to figure
out, on their own, a way to bypass the increasingly protectionist
global intellectual property regime.”98Additionally, the Creative
94. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Or-
dering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 390-91 (2005-
2006).
95. The analogy between the environment and ideas is often described with the
formula “cultural environmentalism”; see James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Prop-
erty: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 108-14 (1997); see also Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons,
70 LAW & CONT. PROB. 23, 23-25 (2007).
96. Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 85, at 23.
97. On property as exclusion, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion v. Govern-
ance, Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 453 (2002)
(arguing that there are two strategies for delineating property rights, i.e., exclusion
and governance, and that exclusion constitutes the core of property because it is more
efficient in terms of information costs); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEBR. L. REV. 739 (1998) (generally, arguing that the right to
exclude is the core entitlement in the owner’s bundle of sticks).
98. Elkin-Koren, supra note 94, at 376.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\62-2\COM203.txt unknown Seq: 19 18-FEB-14 8:34
2014] PROPERTY AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 319
Commons platform relies on the servitude form to enhance the very
sharing, distribution and re-use of creative works that intellectual
property rights limit, without sacrificing author’s self-interest.99
In turn, this sharing promotes democracy and deliberation. As
Yochai Benkler argues, the structure of information production is
critical to democracy in two ways.100 Direct democratic discourse and
participation in formal governance would not be possible without sus-
tainable, widely accessible, and effective communication by
individuals and groups.101 Furthermore, the possibility of sharing
creative works allows “semiotic democracy”; it enables individuals
and groups to participate in producing culture and meaning rather
than simply receiving meanings produced by a small number of pro-
fessional makers of meaning in the cultural industry.102
E. Emphyteusis (Long Lease)
Imagine that the city of Amsterdam seeks to promote mixed-use
redevelopment of an industrial harbor area currently in decline. The
redevelopment plan will establish high-quality waterfront housing
alongside areas devoted to commercial and light industrial uses. The
redevelopment project seeks to counter the destruction of the rural
environment due to urban sprawl, and to enhance the quality of the
urban environment.103 Inflexible application of traditional top-down
planning instruments, such as zoning and environmental regula-
tions, is likely to hinder the proposed development.104 Modern or
Euclidean zoning, the traditional tool most obviously used to plan
new building developments, divides cities into separate residential,
commercial, and industrial uses, often precluding mixed-use develop-
ment.105 Similarly, environmental regulations are likely to set rigid
limits that impede mixed-use, such as noise regulations that prevent
99. Id. at 377 and 378.
100. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons. Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 62 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1262 (2003) (arguing that the model of mass media
communications that dominated the twentieth century suffers from two types of dem-
ocratic deficits that could be alleviated by a greater role for commons-based
production. The first deficit concerns effective political participation, the second defi-
cit concerns cultural politics, or the question of who gets to decide the cultural
meaning of social choices and conditions).
101. Id. at 1263.
102. Id. at 1265.
103. See Willem Korthals Atles & Milly Tambach, Municipal Strategies for Intro-
ducing Housing on Industrial Estates as Part of Compact-City Policies in the
Netherlands, CITIES, 25(4) 218-29 (2008) (discussing several case studies of recent
mixed-use development projects in Dutch cities).
104. Id. at 220 (arguing that “heavy-handed application of the relevant rules can
sound the death knell to such developments”).
105. Id. at 220 (noting that “the possibilities of mixing industry and housing in a
given area may be limited not only by planning instruments created to promote func-
tional separation of uses but also by environmental regulations promulgated to limit
nuisance and protect residents from environmental hazards”).
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certain kinds of construction.106 In a world governed by these tradi-
tional instruments, the city and the developers will bargain over
adjustments to the existing regulatory landscape.
The project, however, will impact a much wider constituency
than the city and the developers. In an ideal world, the redevelop-
ment project would be subject to a deliberative process that is
inclusive, efficient, and predictable. First, approval of and amend-
ments to the project would occur through a process whereby all
affected parties have the opportunity to present their arguments,
rather than through bargaining among the city and the developers.
The interests of the un-represented or under-represented segments of
the community should be of particular concern. For example, the poor
and minority citizens living in adjacent areas might face gradual dis-
placement or changes in their quality of life due to increased traffic
congestion or noise levels.107 Second, the deliberative process should
allow ample room for considering a variety of alternative solutions
that accommodate the interests of the affected parties. Solutions may
include in-kind remediation of the noise or traffic problem, matching
the magnitude of the harm with rough precision; alternatively, a so-
lution might be the provision of unrelated amenities or public goods
such as a park or a school.108 Third, the adjustments to existing land
use regulations should achieve compromise between predictability
and flexibility. The developer would likely want some guarantee that
the agreed upon regulatory adjustment will be “frozen” for a certain
period of time to protect security of his investment. The city, on the
other hand, would probably seek to retain some flexibility in respond-
ing to fluid regulatory needs, as well as to secure anti-entrenchment
protection that would allow future city governments to revisit the
regulatory choices.109
106. Id. at 226 (suggesting that “noise abatement permits that allow companies to
make more noise on paper than they actually emit will be revised to include more
realistic limits since excessive nominal limits place undue restrictions on the housing
construction that is permitted”).
107. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revis-
ited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40, 77 (2000-2001) (describing the problem of as
“underregulation,” i.e., “the phenomenon of selling violation rights too cheaply, in cur-
rency unsatisfactory to, or never received by those who are impacted by the violation”
and noting that “it is quite possible that the controlling interests in a community
might reach an agreement with a landowner that is fully satisfactory to both of the
bargaining parties but which imposes unremediated negative externalities on third
parties-whether a minority within the community, or individuals outside the political
subdivision”).
108. Id. at 5, 28 (discussing the problem of “blocked and inefficient exchanges,” i.e.,
the idea that bargaining limits “prevent mutually beneficial land use deals and gener-
ate vast inefficiencies that harm landowners and communities”). See also David A.
Dana, Land Use regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243
(1997) (arguing that the nexus and proportionality tests in exactions can diminish
allocative efficiency).
109. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law: Binding
Local Governments, 78 U CHI. L. REV. 879, 892-94 (2011) (discussing how, in the
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In Dutch property law, as in other civil law systems, there is a
property form known as emphyteusis, or long lease, that promises to
solve some of the challenges presented by our imaginary redevelop-
ment project.110 Emphyteusis is not a new property form. It is a form
originating in late Antiquity that was dropped from the Dutch Civil
Code of 1948 and re-introduced in the Civil Code of 1992. Emphyteu-
sis is a right in rem that entitles one to use land owned by another for
a long period, or even perpetually, in exchange for a payment called
“canon.” The holder of an emphyteusis has the right to exclude, the
right to use the land and to make decisions as to its management,
and the right to receive the income produced by the land. The right to
use includes the right to erect buildings on the land. Buildings are
owned by the owner of the land, not by the holder of the emphyteusis;
the owner will pay compensation when the right of emphyteusis ends.
The holder of an emphyteusis also has the right to transfer her enti-
tlements: the emphyteusis can be sold, transferred to one’s heirs, and
mortgaged. The holder of the emphyetusis may also parcel out some of
her entitlements by, for example, granting an easement.
In addition, the parties can custom-tailor the content of the right.
In the deed establishing the emphyteusis, the parties may agree on
additional rights and duties known as “conditions,” which are period-
ically revised to meet changing needs. The “conditions” are part of the
property right itself and, hence, have in rem effect (i.e., they are valid
against the world). While the holder of the emphyteusis has, for the
duration of the right, a bundle of entitlements that resembles that of
an owner, the owner of the land retains title, the right to transfer
title, and the right to receive the “canon” payment.111
United States, “development agreements” between local governments and developers
result in loss of regulatory flexibility and entrenchment for the local government).
110. U.S. property scholars have proposed a variety of alternative solutions where
our imaginary re-development project would take shape through a process that is par-
ticipatory, inclusive and efficient. See Fennell, supra note 107, at 68-74 (envisioning a
“call option” that would permit landowners to engage in otherwise forbidden uses by
providing in-kind remediation of cognizable negative externalities. The “call option”
would be alienable allowing the community to effectively buy veto rights with respect
to the proposed use. The “call option” would be coupled with statutory and procedural
protections to ensure that minority interests are heard before any land use deal is
struck); See also Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839, 847, 893-910 (1983) (proposing a
new jurisprudence of piecemeal changes that treats piece meal changes as dispute
mediations and tests fairness and due consideration in light of the local opportunity
for “voice,” i.e., participation, and “exit,” i.e., departure. This solution echoes the pre-
scriptions of deliberative democrats: Rose envisions a mediation process that would
expand the parties’ arguments and information and deliver outcomes that accommo-
date the parties’ interests and are suggestive, but not decisive, for future
accommodations).
111. See 5 BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW][CIVIL CODE] art. 89-97 (Neth.), translated in
HANS WARENDORF ET AL., THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS (2009) (outlining the
default legal regime of emphyteusis); See also CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXTS ON PROP-
ERTY LAW, at 273-79, 280-83 (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012).
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Emphyteusis allows what urban studies scholars describe as a
strategy of “collaborative” land use planning.112 This “collaborative”
strategy replaces top-down regulation with consultation between all
interested parties, and aims at innovatively solving the problems of
urban development and at reaching an outcome acceptable to all
stakeholders.113 Starting in 1896, the city of Amsterdam decided it
would no longer transfer ownership rights on public land, but instead
would only grant rights of emphyteusis.114 The city of Amsterdam
publishes, and periodically revises, “general conditions” applicable to
all emphyteutical rights.115 The “general conditions” include environ-
mental parameters, use restrictions, and land use planning goals.
They contain both mandatory rules and default rules. The “general
conditions” function similarly to what in the United States is called a
“general plan.” Just as the plan is supposedly “created in an atmos-
phere of calm and deliberation,”116 “general conditions” are developed
by the municipal council through a process that involves representa-
tives of the affected parties, i.e., developers, as well as
representatives of the community and experts.
In addition to the “general conditions,” the city, the developers,
and community representatives discuss “special terms”: fine-grained,
project-specific rules that supplement or deviate from the default
terms in the “general conditions.”117 “Special terms” allow the city to
control the details of the development project in a way that is not
possible through traditional land use planning tools. Also, the process
of hammering out the “special terms” promotes the goals of informed
deliberation and participation. Observers note that local govern-
ments tend not to operate very effectively in the cool, abstract,
deliberative setting in which a “general plan” or “general conditions”
are developed. Rather, they argue, concrete problems and actual
112. On “collaborative” land use planning, see Sarah Elwood, Neighborhood Revi-
talization through Collaboration: Assessing the Implications of Neoliberal Urban
Policy at the Grassroots, 58 GEOJOURNAL 121, 123-25 (2002) (discussing the argu-
ments against and in favor of “collaborative” strategies and arguing that the discourse
of collaboration can give community groups greater leverage to demand involvement
and to insert their own knowledge and needs); Korthals & Tambach, supra note 102
(describing the new “city and the environment approach” adopted by Dutch cities);
Gerard Wigmans, Contingent Governance and the Enabling City. The Case of Rotter-
dam, 5 CITY, 216, 218 (2001).
113. Korthals & Tambach, supra note 103, at 6.
114. AKKERMANS, supra note 2, at 281.
115. CITY OF AMSTERDAM DEV. CORP., GROUND LEASE IN AMSTERDAM 7 [hereinafter
GROUND LEASE IN AMSTERDAM], available at http://www.amsterdam.nl/publish/pages/
407897/ab_2000_engduits_web_1.pdf.
116. Rose, supra note 109, at 874.
117. GROUND LEASE IN AMSTERDAM, supra note 115, at 7; see also CITY OF AMSTER-
DAM DEV. CORP., THE USE OF PUBLIC GROUND LEASE IN EUROPEAN CITIES 11 (2005)
[hereinafter PUBLIC GROUND LEASE IN EUROPEAN CITIES], available at http://www.ams
terdam.nl/publish/pages/418782/use_of_public_ground_lease_in_european_cities.pdf.
at 11.
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projects help focus attention and lead to superior collection of infor-
mation.118 These observers suggest that local governments give less
careful consideration to an advance general plan than they do to ac-
tual specific proposals. Similarly, public participation is likely to be
stronger and more effective when the actual development project is
on the table. Again, “advance general planning may fail precisely be-
cause public attention may not come into focus until the plan’s
implications become concrete.”119
A further advantage of the emphyteusis is its flexibility. The
lease is divided into “periods” of twenty-five years. At the end of each
period, the “canon,” or rent, is re-assessed and the most recent ver-
sion of the city of Amsterdam’s “general conditions” automatically
applies to the emphyteusis. The division in periods serves two goals.
First, re-assessment of the canon/rent ensures that the whole com-
munity, rather than solely the individual developer, will benefit from
the increase in the value of the land.120 Increases in the value of the
land granted in emphyteusis are only partially attributable to the de-
veloper’s investment. They are, in significant part, generated by
public investment, changes in the regional economy, and changes in
the way real estate is regulated, financed, and taxed. The periodic
revision of the canon/rent allows the city to capture the increased
value of the land, thereby generating a new source of revenue for the
community. Second, the division in periods serves broader commu-
nity interests by allowing for a balance between regulatory flexibility
and predictability. The general conditions in effect at the time the
emphyteusis is granted will be frozen for twenty-five years, thereby
protecting the developer’s security of investment. On the other hand,
the automatic applicability of the most recent version of the “general
conditions” at the end of the twenty-five years period performs an
anti-entrenchment effect. The local government’s ability to entrench
its urban policy has opportunity costs, e.g., the loss of future regula-
tory flexibility. It also has democratic costs in that it affects the
ability of the local government to respond to its constituents and is
not bound by the preferences of the past.121 The automatic applica-
tion of the revised general conditions at the end of each twenty-five
year term mitigates these costs. Thus, an old medieval form may suc-
cessfully promote the goals of democratic deliberation, efficiency, and
predictability.
118. Rose, supra note 110, at 874-75.
119. Id. at 875.
120. GROUND LEASE IN AMSTERDAM, supra note 114, at 7; PUBLIC GROUND LEASE IN
EUROPEAN CITIES, supra note 116, at 11.
121. Serkin, supra note 108, at 945-50 (discussing the costs of entrenchment).
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F. Common Goods (beni comuni)
Teatro Valle is the oldest theater in Rome; a historic landmark, it
was inaugurated in 1727. Marquis Capranica commissioned the de-
sign of the theater to architect Tommaso Morelli and its 1818
renovation to architect Giuseppe Valadier, both major figures in the
Roman eighteenth and nineteenth century architectural scene. Mar-
quis Camillo Capranica, the theater’s founder and first owner,
intended it to be his private theater. For three centuries, Teatro Valle
has been at the center of Rome’s cultural life. In 1850, an heir of Mar-
quis Capranica married Italian actress Adele Ristori who became the
“director” of the theater and made it the favorite Roman venue of the
most prominent actors from Tommaso Salvini to Sara Bernhardt.122
Teatro Valle later became public property, managed by the Ente
Teatrale Italiano (ETI). When, in 2010, the ETI was shut down as a
result of budgetary cuts, the government announced its intention to
sell Teatro Valle to a private investor to be converted into a restau-
rant. In June 2011, a group of employees, citizens, and artists
occupied Teatro Valle, declaring it a “bene commune” (common good)
to be governed through inclusive public deliberation.123 As of today,
the Teatro Valle is governed by the “Teatro Valle Bene Comune Foun-
dation” established by the occupiers.124
These occupiers were legally savvy. They retrieved a property
form, “common goods,” that can be traced back to Roman law. Roman
law recognized, alongside public and private property, the category of
res communes omnium, common property incapable of being owned
by anyone.125 Res communes omnium were all flowing waters, as well
as air and the sea shore.126 Just as with emphyteusis, the property
form “common goods” had disappeared from modern property law. It
was omitted from the Italian Civil Code of 1865 as well as from the
current code (enacted in 1942). But “common goods” are now back.
The Italian legislature is considering re-introducing this property
form. In 2007, the Ministry of Justice created a committee chaired by
Professor Stefano Rodota,’ a prominent property scholar, charged
with the task of reforming the civil code’s rules on public ownership.
122. On the history of the Teatro Valle, see 2 SAVERIO FRANCHI, DRAMMATURGIA
ROMANA 1701, LXXVI ff. (1997).
123. For the story of the occupation of the Teatro Valle in English, see Ines Della
Valle, Teatro Valle Occupato GOETHE INSTITUT CULTURAL INNOVATORS NETWORK,
http://www.goethe.de/ins/eg/prj/cin/mov/tea/enindex.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
124. TEATRO VALLE OCCUPATO http://www.teatrovalleoccupato.it/ (last visited Jan.
29, 2014).
125. On res communis omnium, see W. W BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW
(3rd ed. revised by Peter Stein 2007) at 180; Inst. II 1, JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 54
(transl. by Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, 1987).
126. Inst. II 1, JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 125.
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The centerpiece of the legislative proposal prepared by this commit-
tee is “common goods.”127
The revival of “common goods” responds to the shortcomings of
both private property and public property for governing resources
that implicate significant public interests. Water is the most obvious
example. In fact, the concept of “common goods” was first revived in
the debate over public water utilities. The water that comes out of
Italian taps is public and municipalities own the infrastructure that
delivers it.128 However, beginning in the 1980s, Italian cities have
“privatized” water utilities, entering long-term leases with the sub-
sidiaries of global water corporate “giants” such as Veolia and Suez.
Experts explain this trend towards privatization by citing the chal-
lenges involved in the provision of public water services.129 In the
last decade, massive increases in water tariffs, lack of transparency,
and competition in the leasing process have alerted citizens and
water policy experts to the shortcomings of privatization.130
Water experts note, however, that public ownership of water has
similar flaws, and in fact there seems to be little meaningful differ-
ence between public and private ownership of water. While a public
owner cannot sell and is immune from losing title or use entitlements
by prescription, in all other respects it is no different than a private
owner, with similar powers to make decisions on the use of the re-
source as well as to transfer use rights. If the municipality transfers
127. See Commissione Rodota per la modifica del codice civile in material di beni
pubblici, June 14th 2007, Relazione, available at http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/
mg_1_12_1.wp?contentId=SPS47617; see discussion infra. The literature on beni
comuni is extensive. See generally UGO MATTEI, BENI COMUNI, UN MANIFESTO (2012);
STEFANO RODOTA’, IL TERRIBILE DIRITTO. STUDI SULLA PROPRIETA’ PRIVATA E I BENI
COMUNI (2013); ALBERTO LUCARELLI, LA DEMOCRAZIA DEI BENI COMUNI (2013); MARIA
ROSARIA MARELLA, OLTRE IL PUBBLICO E IL PRIVATO. PER UN DIRITTO DEI BENI COMUNI
(2012).
128. On the legal regime of water in Italy, see generally ALESSANDRA GORIA & NI-
COLA LUGARESI, THE Evolution of the National Water Regime in Italy (2002), http://
www.euwareness.nl/results/Italy-cs-kaft.pdf; see also UGO MATTEI & ALESSANDRA
QUARTA, ACQUA BENE, COMUNE 17, 26, 11-12 (2013) (discussing the Galli law of 1994
which sought to remedy some of the dangers of privatization, the Decreto Ronchi of
2008 which facilitated privatization and explaining the privatization of water ser-
vices, and its recent reversal, in the Italian city of Aprilia).
129. See, for example, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization trends in
the United States, Human Rights, National Security and Public Stewardship, 33 WM.
& MARY. ENVT’L L. & POL. REV. 785, 793-99 (2008) (discussing the causes of the trend
toward public water utilities privatization); on privatization and its causes in Europe,
see Bernard Barraque’, Past and Future Sustainability of water policies in Europe, 27
NAT. RES. FORUM 200, 207-09 (2003).
130. On the shortcomings of privatization of public water utilities and the “water
crisis” that affected many Italian and French cities in the 1990s, see Raymond Avril-
lier, A Return to the Source. Re-Municipaliztaion of Water Services in Grenoble,
France in RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER 63 (2005); see also Martin Pigeon, Un Eau Pub-
lique pour Paris. Symbolism and Success in the Heartland of Private Water in
REMUNICIPALIZATION. PUTTING WATER BACK INTO PUBLIC HANDS 25-28 (Martin Pigeon
et al. eds., 2012).
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use rights to a private operator, it empties public ownership of most
of its “publicness.” It grants a private operator long-term use rights
(ranging from twenty-five to seventy years) with minimal limits on
both the right to manage the resource and the right to appropriate
the income generated by the water services. Conversely, if the munic-
ipality manages the water services directly, it often acts as a
government extension of the Lockean idea of private ownership.131
The municipality’s duties to manage and use property in the “public
interest” or to hold the property in trust for the public are, in prac-
tice, minor constraints on the municipality’s use and management
rights. Municipal managers are likely to make decisions on the use
and management of water with an eye to immediate budgetary con-
straints, institutional interests in maximizing resource development,
and the short-term economic interest of the human users to whom
they are accountable.
In view of these problems, Italy has spawned a vocal “water
movement” which has called for a new legal conceptualization of
water beyond private or public ownership. Water implicates interests
that go well beyond the short-term economic interest of human users
and raises distributive questions. Potable water serves basic survival
and health needs and, hence, should be equally accessible to all. Fur-
thermore, water involves questions of stewardship and protection of
the interests of future generations.132 Water also implicates funda-
mental non-human, ecological interests. These interests are not
likely to be represented when water is governed through private
property or public property. The concept of “common goods” is being
revived to provide an alternative to public and private ownership.
Ownership of “common goods” differs from public ownership in an im-
portant way, because it gives citizens collectively not only use
entitlements, but also the right to participate in management
decisions.
The legislative proposal produced by the Rodota’ Committee does
not yet work out the fine details of the new property form, but it gives
a good glimpse of how it is to be structured. “Common goods,” the
report suggests, are resources that have two characteristics. First,
they are instrumental to “the enjoyment of fundamental rights and
the autonomous development of the individual” and, second, their use
131. Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water’s Edge: limits to Ownership of Aquatic
Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH. SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 201, 236
(Anthony Craig (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005) (arguing that public ownership has impor-
tant flaws in the case of water and arguing for a concept of “non-ownership” of water).
132. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1269 (1992-1993) (discussing the centrality of non-human as well as long term
human interests in the law of natural resources); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and
the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27 (1996).
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is to be protected for future generations.133 Examples of “common
goods,” the proposal suggests, include (but are not limited to) natural
resources such as “water, parks, forests, glaciers, wildlife and pro-
tected natural areas.” The story of the Teatro Valle suggests that the
category “common goods” may be much broader than natural re-
sources. The manifesto drafted by the occupiers suggests that Teatro
Valle is “inextricably linked to the right to culture, a fundamental
human right” and its preservation for future generations is critical to
stem the commodification and impoverishment of our social and cul-
tural life.134 This language echoes the requirements for common
goods proposed in the Rodota’ report.
“Common goods,” the Rodota’ report states, may be owned by a
private or a public entity. Ownership of “common goods” consists of a
limited bundle of entitlements. First, there are limits to the right to
transfer. When the resource is in public hands, the public owner may
not transfer title at all, but may only transfer use rights, for a limited
term and with no possibility of extension. The idea informing the pro-
posal, one commentator notes, is not to take “common goods”
completely out of the market, but rather to prevent the problems of
lack of transparency and management exclusively driven by profits
that were exposed by the “water movement.”
Second, use entitlements are limited. The private or public owner
has a duty to grant the public access to the resource “in the manner
and within the limits prescribed by laws and regulations.” But the
real innovation that distinguishes ownership of “common goods” from
public property is that the public has the right to participate in the
management of the resource. Citizens’ participation seems to be what
“common goods” are about. The occupiers’ manifesto emphasizes that
“common” is different from “public.” “Real democracy and par-
ticipatory decision-making, the manifesto reads, are not achieved by
granting control to the state and to local governments.”135 The mani-
festo further emphasizes that common goods “are not governed top
down, rather they are self-governed.”136
An important component to deliberative democracy in the con-
text of common goods is institutional structure. The bylaws of the
Teatro Valle translate the commitment to broad public deliberation
into a complex institutional structure, consisting of an “Assembly”
and a “Council.” Any citizens willing to be bound by the by laws may
133. Commissione Rodota’ per la modifica delle norme del codice civile in materia
di beni pubblici (June 14, 2007), Proposta di Articolato, available at http://www.giusti
zia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_12_1.wp?contentId=SPS47617, article 1, 3 (c).
134. Statuto Fondazione Teatro Valle Bene Comune (20/12/2011), Preambolo, at 3.
135. Teatro Valle Occupato, Manifesto (Istruzioni per L’Uso Collettivo), available at
http://www.teatrovalleoccupato.it/category/beni-comuni.
136. Id.
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become a member of the Assembly.137 In language reminiscent of the
Paris Commune of 1871, members are called “comunardi.”138 The
comunardi’s prime duty is responsible participation in the govern-
ance of the theater.139 The Council supervises the artistic direction of
the theater, inviting proposals from the public and managing the
budget according to principles of “justice, sustainability and ecol-
ogy.”140 Similarly, in the case of water utilities, legislation that would
implement the idea of a citizens’ participation is currently being dis-
cussed. For example, art 10 of a legislative proposal presented by the
“Italian water movements” states that “in order to ensure democratic
control over the management of water resources, local governments
will establish mechanisms of deliberative democracy.” These mecha-
nisms, the proposal continues, “allow civil society organizations to
directly participate in management decisions.”141
Citizens’ right to participate in the management of “common
goods” is also reflected in the available remedies. Any individual, the
Rodota’ proposal states, is entitled to bring an action to enjoin man-
agement decisions that harm or threaten access to the preservation of
“common goods.” In other words, while only the state may bring an
action for damages, any citizens may seek injunctive relief. In this
respect, the legislative proposal endorses a right that had earlier
been recognized in a number of important court decisions that paved
the way for the notion of ownership of “common goods.” In a 2009
case, involving a controversy over water tariffs between the city of
Aprilia’s “citizens’s committee for public water” and the water corpo-
rate giant Aqualatina, the court (the Consiglio di Stato) decided that
citizens have a right to seek injunctive relief against management
decisions concerning “resources fundamental to human needs.”142
II. THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE AT WORK: EXPERIMENTALISM
AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
This part offers a structural and qualitative analysis of the
numerus clausus principle. The six deliberative democratic property
forms surveyed in Part I cast new light on the way the numerus
clausus principle works in practice as a structural feature of property
137. Statuto Fondazione Teatro Valle Bene Comune, supra note 133, arts. 3.2 and
3.3.
138. Id. art. 3.2.
139. Id. art. 3.3.
140. Id. art. 11.3.
141. Proposta di Legge D’iniziativa Popolare Concernente Principi per la Tutela, il
Governo e la Gestione Publica delle Acque e Disposizioni per la Ripubblicizzazione del
Servizio Idrico, http://www.acquabenecomune.org/raccoltafirme/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=1060&Itemid=122 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
142. Consiglio di Stato, sentenza 5501/2009, http://www.acquabenecomune.org/
aprilia/Sentenza-del-Consiglio-di-Stato-n,2239.html (last visited Jan 29, 2014); for a
discussion of the decision, see MATTEI & QUARTA, supra note 127, at 11-12.
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systems. The new property forms also reveal something important
about the quality, the new emerging values, of property law.
A. How the Numerus Clausus Principle Works by Constraining
Experimentalism in Property Law
Between the 1950s and the present, six new property forms with
deliberative democratic features were added to the list of standard
property forms. And, as noted, these are by no means the only addi-
tions. This suggests that the list of property forms is revised and
expanded more frequently than conventional numerus clausus wis-
dom allows. The numerus clausus principle therefore does not really
mean that the list of property forms is “closed,” that the number of
forms is fixed, and the content of the list—the specific admitted
forms—is stable. Rather, the numerus clausus principle imposes two
basic, complementary, constraints on the creation of new forms. One
is structural; it concerns the number of forms. The other is substan-
tive, it concerns their content.143
1. The Structural Constraint: Limiting the Number of
Property Forms
There are good reasons for preventing an excessive expansion in
the number of available property forms. The distinctive feature of
property forms is that they are in rem, i.e., they are valid against the
world. All non-owners need to know what the characteristics of each
form are, what duties they impose, and what rights they create. Law
and economics scholars argue that, by limiting the number of prop-
erty forms, the numerus clausus principle reduces the information
costs incurred by third parties who seek to acquire property rights or
to avoid violating them.144 Merrill and Smith persuasively argue that
the optimal number of property forms is one that strikes a good bal-
ance between information and frustration costs.145 Too many
idiosyncratic property forms would generate high information costs
for both prospective buyers and potential violators who need to learn
about the attributes of the property form they encounter.146 Too few
property forms would frustrate the parties’ ability to achieve a vari-
ety of economic and social goals cost-effectively.147
Scholars, who embrace the “virtue” theory of property or the
“democratic” theory of property,148 argue that information costs ex-
143. Davidson, supra note 5, at 1600 (noting that structure and content together
are important to unraveling the problem of the numerus clausus).
144. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 1.
145. Id. at 24-40.
146. Id. at 26-34 (discussing measurement-cost externalities).
147. Id. at 35-38 (discussing frustration costs).
148. For a description of the various theories that go under the label “progressive
property” (including the “virtue” theory and the “democratic” theory); see Singer,
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plain the numerus clausus principle only partially.149 The account of
the development of new deliberative democratic property forms pro-
vided in Part I supports this view; fitting these new forms within the
informational costs framework is problematic for two specific rea-
sons. First, in Part I, we observed an interesting type of dynamism,
one that has received virtually no attention in the numerus clausus
literature. Some forms, such as emphyteusis and common goods, were
first eliminated from and later re-admitted to the list of available
property forms. Information costs provide no explanation for the exit
and reenter of these property forms.
Second, the deliberative democratic property forms that have
been added to the standard list rely on a “governance strategy,”
rather than an “exclusion strategy.”150 Property forms that rely on
exclusion lower information costs by giving the owner virtually all
control over the resource and by imposing a simple duty of abstention
on non-owners.151 By contrast, property forms that rely on a govern-
ance strategy have two characteristics: first, they involve multiple
entitlement holders and, second, they regulate in a fine-grained man-
ner the internal relations among entitlement holders.152 Because of
these two characteristics, governance property forms impose high in-
formation and administrative costs.153 Thus, we are presented with a
paradox: the numerus clausus, a structural principle purportedly de-
signed to lower information costs, has nonetheless allowed the
introduction of new forms that are costly to process.
Democratic Estates, supra note 6, at 1041-45; Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and
Property, 80 FORDH. L. REV. 1017, 1017, 1024-32 (2011-2012) (describing these theo-
ries as “social obligation” theories discussing individual “social obligation” theorists).
149. Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 6, at 1024-26 (noting that Merrill &
Smith’s information costs theory is a welcome corrective to the traditional suspicion of
the estates system but doubting that the information costs account actually explains
the estates system); Davidson, supra note 5, at 1600 (noting that structure and con-
tent together are important at unraveling the problem of the numerus clausus).
150. For a discussion of “governance property” and “exclusion property,” see gener-
ally Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L REV. 1853 (2011-2012);
for a discussion of an “exclusion strategy” as opposed to a “governance strategy”; see
generally Smith, supra note 97.
151. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L REV. 773, 790-91 (2001) (arguing that an exclusion strategy relies on sim-
ple, bright-line rules. It establishes use entitlements in two stages. First, it identifies
the particular resource and specifies which person is the owner of the resource. Sec-
ond, it gives the owner virtually all control on the resource and confers on non-owners
a duty of abstention, i.e., a duty to stay off).
152. See Alexander, supra note 149, at 1856 (defining governance property as en-
tailing multiple owners and governance norms regulating owners internal relations).
See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 151, at 790 (noting that “The in personam strat-
egy proceeds by directly specifying use rights as between specified individuals. It
indicates which of the designated individuals is entitled to engage in which uses of
particular resources).
153. See Smith, supra note 96, at S455 (noting that governance rules pick out users
and uses in more detail, imposing a more intense informational burden on a smaller
audience of duty holders).
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2. The Numerus Clausus Principle and the Democratic
Process and Nature of Property
The recent introduction (or reintroduction) of informationally
inefficient property forms demonstrates that there must be some
other logic underlying the numerus clausus. Democratic values pro-
vide the most plausible justification. Because property forms have an
inherent public quality,154 we want them to be introduced through
democratic processes and to reflect values we approve of collectively.
Property forms are “public” because they are in rem (i.e., valid
against the world), creating rights and obligations even for non-own-
ers and, thus, shaping social relations.155 Through property rights,
the state delegates owners the authority to confer rights and duties
on all others.156 For this authority to be legitimate, citizens should
collectively exercise some control over the content of new property
forms and the way they are created. Their content, i.e., the values
and goals they advance and the type of social relations they generate,
must be of a character the collectivity approves of.157 Also, the new
154. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 1649 (arguing that “the world of property, ame-
nable to private ordering, is and has always been a public institution in its basic
constitution”); Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law
Values 2 (on file with author) (explicating how at as a conceptual matter the private
values of property relate to and interact with property’s public values, so that the two
dimensions of property’s value constitution cohere rather than conflict).
155. For an account of the owner’s bundle of sticks that sees “use control” as the
central stick, see Eric R. Claeys, Bundle of Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic
Scholarship, 8 (3) ECON. JOURNAL WATCH 205, 208 (2011) (I prefer to define “property”
as a right securing an interest in determining exclusively the use of an asset external
to the owner’s person) Larissa Katz, The Regulative Function of Property Rights, 8 (3)
ECON. JOURNAL WATCH 236, 240 (2011) (“The crucial feature of ownership is the au-
thoritative nature of owners’ decisions: owners make decisions about things that
command deference from others.” Thus, “[o]wnership, like sovereignty, relies on a
kind of notional hierarchy, in which the owner’s authority to set the agenda is su-
preme, if not absolute, in relation to other private individuals”); Adam Mossoff, The
False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8(3) ECON. JOURNAL WATCH 255, 255 (2011)
(the right to property secures a use-right in, agenda- setting control over, or a sphere
of liberty in using this thing).
156. Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 6, at 1047 (arguing that property con-
cerns relations among persons, that property rights should be understood not merely
by reference to the powers and rights they give the owner but by reference to the
impacts of the exercise of those powers on others and the shape and character of the
social relationships engendered by those rights and powers); Dorfman, supra note 6,
at 489 (arguing that private ownership commands deference not merely to what an
owner plans to do with an object but rather to her decision concerning the permissibil-
ity of others using her object, regardless of her own plans for it).
157. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 1602 (“[U]nderstanding the numerus clausus
as the mechanism through which legal systems determine the conditions for legal
relations to be recognizes as property underscores the proposition that property while
amenable to private ordering is and has always been a public institution in its basic
constitution”); see also Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 6, at 1048 (arguing that
since property is part of the way we define a legitimate social order, certain property
arrangements are defined as out of bounds, as incompatible with our way of life);
Dagan, supra note 7, at 1566-67 (arguing that the numerus clausus principle shapes
our social values and that “limiting the number of property forms and standardizing
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property forms must be ratified through democratic processes.158 The
numerus clausus principle allows this democratic control on both the
process through which new property forms are created and their con-
tent. Analytically, these two are distinct. A democratic process can
result in the adoption of undemocratic forms of property. For exam-
ple, citizens may conclude, within the democratic process, that, in
certain areas, other values or forms of human interaction are more
important than the democratic deliberative control of resources. And
deliberative democratic forms of property may be added by a non-
democratic process.
Explaining the numerus clausus principle as a mechanism to
promote democratic values and processes helps makes sense of the
two puzzles discussed earlier. First, why were emphyteusis and “com-
mon goods” originally dropped from and later re-admitted to the list
of property forms? These two forms were initially discarded because
nineteenth century legislatures saw them as being at odds with two
central values of modernity: the rejection of feudal hierarchies and
the preoccupation with making land freely alienable in the market.
Emphyteusis was criticized as the legal device that enabled the feudal
hierarchical system of landholding. Through a right of emphyteusis,
an individual could be perpetually bound to a piece of land and bur-
dened with the obligation to provide personal services. No longer
ideologically compatible with the thinking of the day, emphyteusis
was eliminated.
Similarly, “common goods” split control over resources between
multiple owners and contradicted emergent ideas about the benefits
of private property and a free market in land. The Physiocrats, the
French eighteenth century “philosophers-economistes,” emphasized
the importance of granting one owner ample and freely transferable
property rights.159 Later, the belief that only individual ownership
will lead to efficient land use was one of the central tenets of nine-
teenth century economic theory.160 “Common goods” was thus struck
from the list.
their content facilitates the roles of property in consolidating expectations and expres-
sing ideal forms of relationship”).
158. Dorfman, supra note 6, at 468, 501-03 (arguing that the principle of numerus
clausus reflects a concern about legitimate political authority, it pertains to the nor-
mative power of legislating new property rights and their correlative obligations. For
Dorfman, the principle of numerus clausus is a restriction on private legislation of
new forms of property rights and the underlying ideal of political legitimation that
grounds this principle is democratic self-governance).
159. On the centrality of land ownership in Physiocratic philosphical/economic the-
ory, see Warren J. Samuels, The Physiocratic Theory of Property and the State, 75 THE
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 96 (1961); Thomas P. Neill, The Physiocrats’ Con-
cept of Economics, THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 532, 534-38 (1949).
160. See, e.g., PIO BARSANTI, LA SOCIALITA’ NEL SISTEMA DELLA PROPRIETA’ PRIVATA
86-100 (1892). See also Anna di Robilant, Common Ownership and Equality of Auton-
omy, 58 MCGILL L. J. 263 (2012).
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Today, these two property forms have been, or are being, re-in-
troduced because they resonate with the call for deliberative
democratic alternatives over private or public top-down governance
of resources. Vast constituencies, from citizens to economic actors to
policy experts have come to believe in the benefits of democratic de-
liberative governance for resources as diverse as scarce urban land,
fragile natural resources, historic landmarks, or cultural institutions.
Focusing on democratic values also helps make sense of the sec-
ond puzzle. If the numerus clausus principle is designed to lower
information costs, why has it allowed a significant expansion of gov-
ernance property forms that are costly to process? Information costs
are neither the only nor the fundamental concern. In the last fifty
years, we have seen a significant expansion of governance property
forms even in cases where economic theory would recommend exclu-
sion. Law and economics scholars argue that exclusion works well
when the number of potential claimants to the resources is large and
the resource can be defined at a relatively low cost (for example, a
parcel of urban land). By contrast, governance property is appropri-
ate for a limited number of special resources that are difficult to
delineate because they are large, or fugitive, or inherently uncertain
(for example, grazing land, fisheries or water for irrigation).161 For
these resources, exclusion is costly and the benefits of a fine-grained
regulation of use entitlements are significant.
But introduction of deliberative democratic property forms sug-
gest that, in practice, things are different. In practice, we don’t
reserve governance strategy for only those situations where physical
and economic characteristics such as size, instability of the resource
stocks, or highly rivalrous consumption make exclusion impractical
or costly. Instead, we have increasingly relied on governance property
when the resource implicates fundamental public values.162 The case
of Teatro Valle in Rome is illustrative. From one perspective, Teatro
Valle, is just a unit of real estate for which exclusion is neither costly
nor impractical. However, for the common goods movement, it is
much more than a unit of real estate. It has historically been a cen-
tral piece of Italian culture. As such, it implicates a fundamental
public value: cultural democracy.163 A form of ownership that democ-
161. Merrill & Smith, supra note 151, at 798 (“Governance rules also have unique
advantages when we deal with resources that are difficult to package into easily mea-
sured and monitored parcels such as are required for exclusion strategies to work.
Land and tangible objects can be marked with boundaries, which are visible to others
and can be monitored for violations. But other types of re-sources, such as ocean fish-
eries, submerged oil, clean air, and ideas, are much more difficult to divide into
parcels.”).
162. See Alexander, supra note 154, at 2 (discussing how private and public values
are intertwined in property law and listing, among the public values, equality, inclu-
siveness, community, participation, self-constitution).
163. See Benkler, supra note 100, at 1262.
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ratizes the governance of the Teatro Valle enables citizens to
participate in producing culture and meaning, rather than merely re-
ceiving meanings produced by the cultural industry. It is this
fundamental public value that justifies a form of ownership that en-
tails high administrative and information costs.
3. Expanding the Democratic Account of the Numerus
Clausus Principle: How the List is Pruned and
Expanded
Democratic accounts of the numerus clausus principle suggest
that the inherently public quality of property rights justifies substan-
tive and procedural limits on the creation of new property forms. New
property forms must reflect values the collectively approves of and
must be ratified through democratic processes. But how does the pro-
cess of creating new forms and pruning old ones happen? Who are the
actors involved?
Existing democratic accounts of the numerus clausus principle do
not provide satisfactory answers to these questions. Property schol-
ars describe the process of managing the list as one where market
actors generate new property forms that best suit their economic
needs and legislatures ratify the new property forms. These scholars
argue that there are good reasons why new property forms need legis-
lative ratification and why courts are not the appropriate source of
innovation in property law. Merrill & Smith suggest that legislative
ratification is preferable because it ensures that newly created prop-
erty forms are set forth in a text that is clear, stable, easy to identify,
universal in its application and comprehensive in its scope.164 Simi-
larly, Avihay Dorfman argues that only property forms enacted by
the democratically elected legislature will be truly “co-authored” and
“self-given” by the collectivity.165 A closer look at how some of the
deliberative democratic property forms were introduced complicates
this neat picture of market actors generating new forms and legisla-
tures ratifying them. It expands our understanding of the procedural
and institutional dimension of the numerus clausus principle in two
significant ways.
First, it shows yet a deeper democratic layer of the process by
which new forms are added to the standard list. The existing litera-
ture on the numerus clausus has largely ignored the role citizens and
social movements play in the creation of new property forms. It is not
always the case that new property forms are generated by market
164. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 60-65 (discussing six advantages of making
legislatures the agents of change: clarity, universality, comprehensiveness, stability,
prospectivity, implicit compensation).
165. For Dorfman, court decisions are neither co-authored, because they involve
only the particular parties to the dispute, nor self-given, because the final decision is
made by an unelected judge; see Dorfman, supra note 6, at 505, 508-10.
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actors seeking their economic self-interest and subsequently ratified
by legislatures.166 Rather, it is often citizens motivated by public val-
ues who generate new forms that are then approved by the
legislature.
Admitting a new property form to the numerus clausus list may
seem a task remote from the concerns of the vast majority of citizens.
But the debate over “common goods” in Italy presents a different sce-
nario—one where a large network of locally based “movements for
the recognition of common goods” are campaigning for the creation of
a new property form. Widely disparate constituencies, from users of
water utilities to individuals active in the world of arts & sciences to
environmentalists, are vocal in arguing that justice and efficiency
both require more equal access to resources that satisfy basic needs,
and are further demanding a voice in their management. The move-
ments have found an ally in a group of property scholars who have
given legal form to their arguments. Similarly, in the United States,
the development of the community land trust involved a cooperative
effort of citizen-activists and experts. In the 1970s, the impetus for
the creation of the community land trust came from a wide movement
of neighborhood residents and community development organiza-
tions. The legal structure of the community land trust was then
sketched in a number of influential policy papers published by the
Institute for Community Economics in the 1980s. In turn, these pub-
lications served as the foundation for federal legislation.167
Moreover, in addition to illustrating the depth of public partici-
pation in the introduction of new property forms, understanding the
numerus clausus as a product of democracy also illuminates the role
courts play in the management of the numerus clausus list. Hanoch
Dagan’s suggestion that courts may function as public fora of grass-
roots democracy has remained an isolated intuition in the numerus
clausus literature.168 However, the process by which some of the de-
liberative democratic property forms were introduced confirms this
intuition. Courts have functioned as catalysts of democratic move-
ments’ demands. For example, in the case of common goods, a 2009
166. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 1025.
167. Towey, supra note 47, at 338-39 (noting that what is now considered the clas-
sic CLT structure was sketched in a number of influential policy papers in the 1970s,
in particular, The Community Land Trust Handbook, published by the Institute for
Community Economics in 1982. These publications were so influential in the under-
standing of the CLT structure that their approach to the CLT served as the
foundation for federal legislation, the Cranston-Gonzales Act of 1992).
168. Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 7-8 (Shyam Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that “the story about the
evolution of common law is largely that of a series of cautious, incremental changes
resulting from the interpretation of the existing legal landscape, which eventually
generate new and at times innovative doctrines” and suggesting that “the possibility,
however limited, that courts function in property matters as public fora of grassroots
democracy on the other, and a priori preference for legislation seems questionable”).
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decision of the Italian Consiglio di Stato gave legal form to the core
argument of the social movements: that all citizens should have a
voice in the management of resources that serve basic needs. The de-
cision fleshed out one of the critical features of the new property
form: anyone can seek an injunction against management decisions
that threaten common goods.169 Similarly, in the United States, de-
cades of innovative and expansive judicial interpretations of the
common law public trust doctrine have de facto designed a new prop-
erty form for natural resources. This increasingly broad expansion of
the doctrine by courts played an important part in kindling the envi-
ronmental movement in the early 1970s.170 “Environmental activists,
one observer notes, widely hailed the emergence of the new public
trust as the legal tool that would finally empower them against pow-
erful private and government interests they believed imperiled
natural resources nationwide.”171 Thus, although courts seem intui-
tively undemocratic, they have actually promoted the democratic
creation of new property forms by the citizens.
B. The Quality of the New Property Forms: The Commitment to
Deliberative Democracy
1. Property and Deliberative Democracy
The property forms discussed in Part I share an important qual-
ity. To varying degrees, they each have built in mechanisms of
deliberative democracy. They suggest that decisions over specific re-
sources should be made not by a single owner, whether private or
public, but through a deliberative process accessible to a large num-
ber of affected parties. My argument is not that these property forms
actually realize the ideal of deliberative democracy. This claim would,
obviously, be untenable.172 Rather, I argue that these property forms
reflect an aspiration to deliberative and democratic decision making
that is often imperfectly realized.
These relatively recent additions to the list of standard property
forms reveal something new about the way, in contemporary liberal
democracies, we think about property. We have come to believe that
property can and should foster democratic deliberation over the use
of some critical resources. This new, still emergent, idea about the
benefits of the institution of property builds on and expands on two
169. Consiglio di Stato, sentenza 5501/2009, available at http://www.acquabene
comune.org/aprilia/Sentenza-del-Consiglio-di-Stato-n,2239.html.
170. Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-Political Theory of the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 35 VERMONT L. REV. 563, 566 (2011).
171. Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public
Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31ENVTL. L. 477, 479–80 (2001).
172. See, for example, the literature on the flaws of the common interest commu-
nity as a democratic forum, supra note 24.
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existing, and at times seemingly contradictory, ideas about the bene-
fits of property as a device for managing resources.
The first idea is the idea of property as its owner’s “castle.”173
This idea has shaped the way the institution of private property has
developed in modern times. In the modern European and American
tradition, the image of property as the castle delivers two important
benefits. The first benefit is individual self-realization. By granting
owners broad control over their property, modern property law
sought to promote owners’ material ability to determine and pursue
their ends and the related sense of stability, identity, and responsibil-
ity.174 The idea of property as its owner’s castle also yields a second
benefit: the efficient use of resources. Securing owners’ broad control
over their property also allows efficient bargaining over the most pro-
ductive use of resources. In this regard, the image of property as its
owner’s castle was critical to one of the major structural changes of
modernity. The shift from the feudal social order where land was un-
productive because tied up in a hierarchy based on status and
privilege, to the modern social order where owners are free to trade
and compete with one another.175
The second idea about property and its benefits is the civic re-
publican idea of “property as propriety.” Historians and theorists of
property have traced throughout American history a vision of prop-
erty as the foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social
order.176 On this view, the core purpose of private property is not to
facilitate the satisfaction of individual preferences or to increase pro-
ductivity, but to realize some prior normative vision about how
society and the institutions that govern it should be structured.177To
be sure, defining what the proper social order is, and has always
been, a controversial question. In American history, there have been
different substantive visions of the proper social order and, hence,
multiple versions of the “proprietarian” conception of property.178
173. For a discussion of the castle model of property, see Joseph W. Singer, The
Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obliga-
tions, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314-16 (2006).
174. The self-realization benefit of property is discussed in the literature on prop-
erty and “personhood”; see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957, 957 (1981-1982) (arguing that “[t]he premise underlying the personhood
perspective is that to achieve proper self-development, to be a person, an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment. The necessary assur-
ances of control take the form of property rights”).
175. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk-
tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 131 (1998-1999)
(emphasizing the link between property, trade and competition); See Jedediah Purdy,
A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property. A Renewed Tradition for New Debates,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1251-58 (2005) (discussing the origins of the freedom promot-
ing-approach in the thought of Adam Smith).
176. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 1.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 2-3.
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The creation of new deliberative democratic property forms sug-
gest that, alongside the “castle” and “propriety” ideas of property, a
third is emerging. Property can deliver yet another benefit: it can fos-
ter democratic deliberation over the use of some critical resources. In
other words, a desirable social order is one where these resources are
governed through a process that is inclusive and focused on reason-
giving. In turn, such open and deliberative process will produce bet-
ter decisions, decisions that are both more efficient and more just.179
Property forms that promote these processes thus reflect a collective
judgment that our society as a whole ought to move in a more demo-
cratic direction.
Certainly, the property as the castle owner conception has not
disappeared. If the resource owned is personal (one’s home, a family
heirloom, a car, etc.), the owner is the lord of her castle. Property
entitlements are structured so as to reflect the idea that these items
are closely bound up with personhood, they are part of the way we
constitute ourselves.180 Personal property is not the only realm
where individuals have extraordinary latitude in making decisions
about property. In a market economy, the property system recognizes
the benefits of granting individual owners ample use and manage-
ment entitlements over productive resources, provided certain
minimum terms are met. For example, a commercial landlord has
broad decision-making power over her property, as long as she com-
plies with the minimum standards set in landlord and tenant law’s
compulsory terms and implied warranties.
But, for resources that satisfy basic human needs, involve long-
range human interests, or involve non-human, ecological interests,
our property system is coming to reflect the idea that democratic de-
liberation is desirable. The re-development of a parcel of scarce urban
land in the city of Amsterdam is a decision that is critical to the com-
munity’s ability to preserve or increase its economic vitality as well
as its “social capital.”181 Similarly, decisions about the lease of an Al-
pine water spring involve economic and productive interests, the
community’s ecological, aesthetical, or recreational needs, and the
stewardship duty owed to future generations. Deliberative demo-
cratic property forms recognize the complexity and interdependence
of these decisions.
At the core of deliberative democracy is the idea of free public
reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions.182 Delib-
179. See infra at Part II.B.2.
180. See generally Radin, supra note 173.
181. See Sheila Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban
Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 527-29 (2006).
182. Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 186
(Jon Elster ed., 1998) (contrasting an “aggregative” conception of democracy, where
decisions are collective if they arise “from arrangements of binding collective choice
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erative democracy has two features that enable it to balance these
complex interests.183 First, it involves collective decision-making
with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or
their representatives.184 Second, it requires reason giving, reasons of-
fered by and to participants in the decision making process.185 It is
critical to the deliberative democratic process that the reasons given
be reasons that others, as free and equals seeking fair terms of coop-
eration, can accept.186 In other words, the reasons must be “public,”
in the sense that their content must be accessible and understanda-
ble to those to whom they are addressed.187
The idea of deliberative democracy is as old as democracy itself.
In his eulogy of Athenian democracy, Pericles noted “instead of look-
ing on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of action, we think
it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.”188 The del-
egates to the French Assemblee Costituante of 1789 expressed similar
democratic deliberative ideals. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes insisted
that democracy is about “proposing, listening, concerting, and chang-
ing one’s opinion in order to form in common a common will.”189 In
the first U.S. Congress, the representatives rejected a proposal to
give citizens, as part of the Bill of Rights, “a right to instruct their
officials.” Roger Sherman argued that “if they were to be guided by
instructions, there would no use for deliberation.”190
that give equal consideration to the interests of each person bound by the decision” to
“deliberative” democracy where a decision is collective if it emerges “from arrange-
ments of binding collective choice that establish conditions of free public reasoning
among equals who are governed by the decisions”; in the deliberative conception, Co-
hen notes, “citizens treat one another as equals not by giving equal consideration to
interests, perhaps some interests ought to be discounted by arrangements of collective
choice, but by offering justifications for the exercise of collective power framed in
terms of considerations that can, roughly speaking, be acknowledged by all as rea-
sons”). See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
7 (2004) (arguing that deliberative democracy is “a form of government in which free
and equal individuals and their representatives justify decisions in a process in which
they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but
open to challenge in the future”).
183. See Jon Elster, Introduction, in GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 8
(arguing that theories of deliberative democracy differ widely and identifying two
common core ideas: the democratic idea and the deliberative).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 3 (arguing that the reasons
given in the deliberative process “should appeal to principles that individuals who are
trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject”).
187. Id. at 4.
188. Elster, supra note 183, at 1.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 4.
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Around the 1990s, deliberative democracy enjoyed a revival
among theorists of democracy.191 This revival has largely overlooked
the development of deliberative property forms, but the addition of
deliberative property forms to the standard list signals something
novel and important. It suggests that deliberative democracy is not
only a form of politics, a matter for the organization of the state. De-
liberation should extend more broadly, beyond the existing
representative institutions of liberal democracy. The deliberative
democratic ideal of justification through inclusive public reasoning
can serve as a model for collective decision-making in variety of insti-
tutional and social arrangements.192 Property is such an institution
where an expansion of deliberative democracy is desirable.
2. The Benefits of Deliberative Property Forms
Property forms that encourage deliberation are desirable be-
cause they serve several distinct purposes. First, deliberation leads to
better decisions. When the resource involved is one that involves pub-
lic interests, decisions deliberated by a diverse group of actors are
likely to be better decisions than decisions made by one owner,
whether private or public. The very act of communication, i.e., the
process of articulating reasons to others and defending them, makes
it likely that the resulting decisions are informed and thought
through.193 To begin with, deliberation facilitates the revelation of
information. Participants are prone to reveal relatively nuanced in-
formation about their preferences and whether these preferences are
191. JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND V (2000) (arguing
that, prior to the deliberative turn, democratic theory understood democracy largely
in terms of aggregation of preferences or interests into collective decisions through
devices such as voting and representation).
192. Theorists of deliberative democracy are divided on whether deliberative de-
mocracy should apply only to the core institutions of liberal democracy or, more
broadly, to a variety of social arenas. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at
32. Among the former, Jürgen Habermas argues for democracy only in those institu-
tions that are at the core of a constitutionally organized democracy. Habermas offers
two reasons for this limitation: a) the demands of deliberation cannot be generally
applied even to all governmental institutions; for example executive agencies or gov-
ernmental institutions that protect familial privacy should not be forced to deliberate
publicly; b) extending the deliberative mandate to all institutions would threaten the
freedom of citizens; society must remained relatively unstructured to allow for free-
will formation. See Jürgen Habermas, Deliberative Politics, in DEMOCRACY 107, 114-
15, 120-21 (David Estlund ed., 2002). Among the latter, see Cohen, supra note 182, at
186 (arguing that because the requirements for free public reasoning among equals
are not narrowly political, deliberative democracy is not exclusively a form of politics,
it is a framework of social and institutional arrangements that facilitate free reason-
ing among equal citizens by providing favorable conditions for expression, association
and participation while ensuring that citizens are treated as free and equal in that
discussion”).
193. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 10 (arguing that “even with regard
to decisions with which many disagree, most of us take one attitude towards those
that are adopted after careful consideration of the relevant moral claims”).
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weak or strong.194 Additionally, deliberation helps correct mistakes
resulting from incomplete understanding. Decision makers inevitably
make mistakes when they make collective decisions. A deliberative
forum, through the “give and take” of argument, allows participants
to learn from each other and to correct their misapprehensions.195
Furthermore, deliberation produces better decisions, because the act
of deliberation involves not only choosing among alternatives but also
generating new alternatives that will more successfully withstand
critical scrutiny. Deliberation is a means for lessening the impact of
bounded rationality, the fact that our imagination and analytical
abilities are limited and fallible.196 Faced with a complex problem,
participants pool their limited capabilities through discussion, in-
creasing the odds of making good decisions.197 Finally, a deliberative
process with broad participation delivers better decisions because it
represents a wider set of interests and values. In turn, broader repre-
sentation makes for Pareto-superior decisions or better decisions in
terms of distributive justice.198
Second, deliberation is a response to the fact of moral pluralism
and disagreement. Currently, a great deal of literature addresses the
fact of value pluralism in property law. Pluralistic theories of prop-
erty recognize that property involves plural and incommensurables
values, and that no single foundational value may be dispositive of a
property decision.199 We disagree on the values property rules should
serve. Any decision regarding the use and management of resources
that are important for the community implicates a host of values
from efficiency and autonomy to distributive justice, to responsibility
and stewardship.200 These values are often in conflict, each dictating
different outcomes, and decision makers have to make hard choices.
194. See James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY, supra note 182, at 45-46.
195. Elster, supra note 183, at 11.
196. Fearon, supra note 194, at 49.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 11.
199. See Alexander, supra note 147, at 1020, 1021 (contrasting monism and plural-
ism and discussing different types of pluralism in property law. Alexander notes that
“[r]egardless of their understanding of values, monists make the same basic claim.
There is, they claim, only one fundamental value, whether that value is framed in
terms of goods or principles.” By contrast, for Alexander, “pluralists resist such reduc-
tionism. They hold that there may be multiple values that are equally valid and
equally fundamental and that these values sometimes conflict with each other. More-
over, as we shall later see, pluralists often regard conflicting yet equally valid moral
values to be incommensurable in the sense that there is no possible hierarchical or-
dering of them in terms of importance or weight”).
200. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011) (discussing
the values that are part of a pluralistic theory of property: “Property is an umbrella
for a set of institutions [bearing a mutual family resemblance], serving a pluralistic
set of liberal values: autonomy, utility, labor, personhood, community, and distribu-
tive justice. Property law, at least at its best, tailors different configurations of
entitlements to different property institutions, with each such institution designed to
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Deliberative democracy does not eliminate the fact of moral disa-
greement. In fact, deliberative democracy does not offer a way to
come to a definite conclusion; almost always, deliberative democracy
has to be supplemented by other decision-making procedures.201 For
example, the decision-making procedure outlined in the bylaws of the
Teatro Valle is one of mixed arguing and voting. Similarly, emphyteu-
sis has a mixed system where deliberation among the multiple
stakeholders is followed by bargaining between the city and the de-
velopers. Regardless of what other procedure is used to supplement
deliberation and arrive at a decision, democratic deliberation boosts
the legitimacy of decisions in the face of moral disagreement.202 Hard
decisions are made more acceptable to those who disagree by the fact
that they are adopted after careful consideration of the conflicting
values implicated. The most familiar theories of property (utilitarian-
ism, libertarianism, liberal-egalitarianism) are “first-order” theories
that seek to resolve moral disagreement by demonstrating that the
alternative principles of their rivals should be rejected.203 Delibera-
tive democracy is a “second order” theory that provides a way of
dealing with the conflicting claims of first order theories.204 It rests
match the specific balance between property values best suited to its characteristic
social setting”).
201. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 18; Elster, supra note 183, at
5-7 (arguing that when a group of equal individuals are to make a decision on a mat-
ter that concerns them all and the initial distribution of opinion falls short of
consensus, they can go about it in three different ways: arguing, bargaining and vot-
ing. Political decision making usually involves all three procedures. Voting will tend
to arise when an issue has to be decided urgently, bargaining will tend to arise when
participants have unequal rates of time discounting or through logrolling due to the
unequal intensity of preferences over the issues to be traded against each other); see
also JOSHUA COHEN, DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 5 (1989), http://philo
sophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/JCOHENDELIBERATIVE%20DEM.pdf, (ar-
guing that, while ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated
consensus, even under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensus will be
reached. If it is not, “then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of
majority rule. The fact that it may so conclude does not, however, eliminate the dis-
tinction between deliberative forms of collective choice and forms that aggregate non-
deliberative preferences. The institutional consequences are likely to be different in
the two cases, and the results of voting among those who are committed to finding
reasons that are persuasive to all are likely to differ from the results of an aggrega-
tion that proceeds in the absence of this commitment”).
202. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 10, 27-29 (arguing that the general
aim of deliberative democracy is to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing
with moral disagreement in politics); Cohen, supra note 182, at 187-89 (discussing the
background fact of reasonable pluralism, i.e., the fact that there are distinct, incom-
patible philosophies of life to which reasonable people are drawn under favorable
conditions for the exercise of practical reason). Critics argue that deliberative democ-
racy is not necessary at all in justifying political decisions, see Joseph Raz,
Disagreement in Politics, 43 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE 25 (1998) (arguing
that the process of justifying an outcome to the people who are bound by it contributes
anything of significance to its legitimacy or justice and that decisions have all the
authority they need if they are right or just).
203. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 13.
204. Id. at 13.
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on the idea of “agreeing to disagree.”205 In other words, deliberation
does not make conflicting values compatible, but it boosts the legiti-
macy of outcomes by asking participants to agree on the principle of
“mutual respect,” i.e., to give reasons and to recognize the merit of
their opponents’ reasons.206
Third, deliberative democratic mechanisms in property forms are
not only valuable instrumentally simply because they lead to better
and more legitimate decisions, they are also inherently valuable. Sig-
nificant value lies in the very act of justifying decisions. In the
Aristotelian view, our ability to live a well-lived life, a life of dignity,
depends on “the cultivation of our specifically human capacity to rea-
son in cooperation with others.”207 Property forms with built-in
deliberative mechanisms encourage a public-spirited, self-governing
citizenry. The idea that property is necessary to promote a robust
civic ethos has long been one of the themes of the civic republican
discourse throughout American history.208 In Europe, the civic re-
publican theme was rooted in Renaissance political thought and
partially reflected in the life of the Italian medieval communes. It has
been obliterated by the prevalence of the classical liberal tradition of
possessive individualism, with its focus on shielding autonomous in-
dividuals from the potentially tyrannical demands of the collectivity.
The current changes in property forms may be seen as signaling the
emergence of a new “republicanized” version of social democracy.209
3. The Problems of Deliberative Property Forms
A variety of objections, both theoretical and practical, have been
leveled against deliberative democracy. These objections are not fatal
to deliberative property forms but they do call for answers.
205. Id. at 79 (arguing that mutual respect is a form of agreeing to disagree).
206. Id. (arguing that mutual respect demands more than toleration; “it requires a
favorable attitude toward and constructive interaction with the persons with whom
one disagrees. It consist in a reciprocal positive regard of citizens who manifest the
excellence of character that permits a democracy to flourish in the face of (at least
temporarily) irresolvable moral conflict” and at 80 arguing that mutual respect makes
two demands of persons: that one presents one’s own moral position and that one
acknowledge the moral status of one’s opponents’ argument).
207. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROP-
ERTY THEORY 82 (2012). See also Alexander, supra note 150, at 1876 (arguing that
governance property contributes to the development of virtues. It inculcates certain
important virtues more effectively than does exclusion property and that virtue devel-
opment is both a distinctive characteristic of governance property institutions and a
major reason for their remarkable growth). See also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 182, at 80 (arguing that the value of mutual respect which is the foundation of
the idea of deliberative democracy can contribute not only to social good but also to
individual virtue).
208. See generally ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY, supra note 12.
209. See generally ERIK J. OLSEN, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF
DEMOCRACY 222 (2006) (examining the relationship between property, civic republi-
canism and democracy in European social thought as well as in Post-Socialist thought
and arguing for a “republicanized” version of social democracy).
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a. Deliberative property forms sacrifice just outcomes for
the sake of inclusive deliberation
A fundamental theoretical objection against deliberative prop-
erty forms is that they sacrifice substantively desirable or just
outcomes for the sake of inclusive, deliberative or otherwise fair
processes. The principles of deliberative democracy, critics may ar-
gue, do not prescribe the substance of the decisions but only the
procedures by which the decisions are made.210 A deliberative, inclu-
sive, and fair procedure justifies any outcome reached through that
procedure, even if the outcome itself is not just or fair. In other words,
deliberative democracy does not give justice any special priority over
process.211
For example, imagine the lease of a publicly owned water spring,
a “common good,” to a private bottled water company. The municipal-
ity has to decide whether to lease the spring at all, and if so, what the
conditions of the lease will be (the rent, the quantity of water the
company can take, the environmental safeguards the company has to
adopt, etc.). Imagine that the affected parties (the municipality, rep-
resentatives of the various regional water authorities,
representatives of local residents, environmental organizations) de-
liberate, through a fair and inclusive procedure, to lease the water
spring at a low rent and with few and insignificant restrictions. Or
imagine that the governing board of a community land trust (prop-
erly representing all the relevant constituencies) proposes an
amendment to the bylaws, which decrees that unit owners who are
behind with rent payments have to perform forced labor. The mem-
bers of the community land trust, following a fair and inclusive
procedure, deliberate and adopt the amendment. In both examples,
opponents of the decision will argue that, however valuable delibera-
tion may be, it should not take precedence over just outcomes. In the
first example, they will argue that the lease decision violates funda-
mental precepts of environmental justice. It gives away a scarce
common good—high quality alpine water—for private profit. Fur-
ther, it encourages the bottled water industry, which has detrimental
effects on the environment. In the second example, opponents will
note that the amendment to the community land trust’s bylaws vio-
lates fundamental principles of human dignity. Opponents of these
decisions will argue that in cases of this kind, where the stakes are
high and the answer is clear, the deliberative inclusive nature of the
process should not trump a just outcome.
How can deliberative democrats respond to this objection? One
can argue that deliberative democracy in property is not a merely
210. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 23-24.
211. Id. at 40.
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procedural theory.212 Rather it is a more substantive conception. This
substantive conception is inherent in the core idea of deliberative de-
mocracy: free public reasoning among equals. Deliberative democracy
asks participants to offer reasons that can be accepted by free and
equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation. This very idea of free
and equal personhood rejects outcomes that, although reached by fair
and inclusive procedures, violate fundamental principles of human
agency, dignity, or integrity.213 In other words, outcomes of the delib-
erative process need to reflect what it means to respect individuals as
free and equal citizens. The amendment to the community land
trust’s bylaws prescribing forced labor for unit owners who fail to pay
the rent violates human dignity and agency and is thus clearly at
odds with this principle.
Deliberative democrats can also suggest that deliberation is usu-
ally the least unsatisfactory way to arrive at just decisions.
Deliberation is not a panacea that can turn bad outcomes into good
ones, but it is better than the alternatives. Importantly, the delibera-
tive process is dynamic and keeps open the possibility to continue the
dialogue. For Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson, deliberative de-
mocracy asks free and equal citizens and their representatives to
engage in public reasoning with the aim of reaching conclusions that
are “binding in the present but open to challenge in the future.”214 In
the example where the community leased the water spring at condi-
tions that violate principles of environmental justice, the demand for
justification will persist after the decision. Retrospective accountabil-
ity may contribute to better decision making in the future by calling
participants in the decision-making process to critical account after
the fact.215 To further promote this retrospective accountability, de-
liberative property institutions should recognize the provisional
212. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 23-24 (describing, and re-
jecting, a purely proceduralist view of deliberative democracy.) According to a purely
procedural notion, deliberative democracy does not prescribe the substance of the de-
cisions but only the procedures by which decisions are made and the conditions
necessary for the procedures to work fairly. Hence, citizens and their representatives,
within broad procedural limits, should be as free as possible to determine the content
of laws. Including substantive principles in the deliberative ideal would in effect pre-
empt the moral and political authority of citizens. Racial and religious discrimination
are wrong but the question of whether a particular decision should be so described or
whether wrong decisions should be overridden by more compelling considerations
should be left to citizens and their accountable representatives not to theorists and
their substantive principles.
213. Id. at 24. See also Cohen, supra note 182, at 192-93 (suggesting that a purely
procedural conception limited to values such as openness and impartiality associated
with fair process is incorrect and proposing a substantive conception that descends
from the core idea of free reasoning among equal citizens).
214. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 6-7.
215. Id. at 45.
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nature of decisions and provide mechanisms for regular reconsidera-
tion of decisions, such as sunset rules that force reviews of policies.216
b. Deliberative democracy in property is unfeasible
A second set of objections focuses on practical challenges, ques-
tioning the feasibility of deliberative democracy in property.
Deliberative property forms may not be feasible owing to the sheer
number of affected parties needing consultation, and/or their lack of
expertise. Social choice theorists fear that deliberative democratic in-
stitutions may open the door to an unmanageable proliferation of
participants with limited competence to make decisions on highly
complex matters.217
Deliberative democrats have good responses to the numbers and
expertise objections. As to numbers, deliberative democrats acknowl-
edge that the room cannot hold everyone, but note that changes in
information technology have greatly facilitated mass involvement in
different kinds of processes, at different levels. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to remember that direct democracy, with citizens gathering
in assemblies, is not the only way to institutionalize deliberative de-
mocracy.218 The democratic part of deliberative democracy is
satisfied when all who will be affected by the decision or their repre-
sentatives are allowed to participate.219
As to the expertise objection, making decisions over an urban re-
development project or the terms of a lease of water utilities infra-
structure does often involve complex technical know-how.
Participants in the decision-making process will likely not have the
competence and will have to rely on experts. But the fact that expert
opinion is involved does not mean that the reasons given are inacces-
sible. As long as experts describe their findings in ways that
participants can understand, and as long as the expert opinion is plu-
ralistic and subject to scrutiny, reliance on expert knowledge does not
216. Id. at 60.
217. DRYZEK, supra note 191, at 58.
218. See COHEN, supra note 182, at 10 (arguing that the irrelevance objection
starts from the assumption that a direct democracy with citizens gathering in legisla-
tive assemblies is the only way to institutionalize a deliberative procedure. Premising
that, and recognizing that direct democracy is impossible under modern conditions,
the objection concludes that we ought to be led to reject the ideal because it is not
relevant to our circumstances. But Cohen notes that, while the claim about the impos-
sibility of direct democracy is plainly correct, there is no merit in the claim that direct
democracy is the uniquely suitable way to institutionalize the ideal procedure. For
Cohen, there is no reason to be confident that a direct democracy would subject politi-
cal questions to deliberative resolution, even if a direct democracy were a genuine
institutional possibility. In other words, we cannot simply assume that large gather-
ings with open-ended agendas will yield any deliberation at all, or that they will
encourage participants to regard one another as equals in a free deliberative
procedure.
219. Elster, supra note 183, at 8.
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detract from the deliberative nature of the decision-making
process.220
A more radical practical objection suggests that deliberative
democratic property forms rest on unrealistic assumptions about par-
ticipants’ “rationality.”221 The ideal deliberative democratic process
assumes a “communicative rationality.” It assumes that participants
in the decision-making process enter into communication with open
minds, a willingness to listen to the arguments of others, and a readi-
ness to be rationally swayed by the strongest argument.222 But this is
an unrealistic assumption.223 In fact, humans tend to be strategic
and instrumental when they approach communication, usually hav-
ing set objectives in mind and viewing communication with others as
a way of achieving these objectives. For example, how likely is it that
the parties negotiating the terms of an emphyteutical lease for a rede-
velopment project will adopt a purely communicative rationality? The
developer, the municipality, the representatives of the community all
have very different objectives and will approach the deliberation ta-
ble strategically, resolved to achieve their particular ends.
Deliberative democrats acknowledge that participants enter
communication with varying degrees of willingness to listen to argu-
ments.224 However, they have two responses. First, the very
participation in deliberation may increase participants’ deliberative
ethos. Cognitive scientists show that, if people enter communication
with some willingness to consider arguments, “communicative ration-
ality” can increase over time as a result of communication with
others. In other words, a decision-making process that starts as in-
strumental and strategic may drift toward a deliberative practice.225
Such drifting can be furthered by thoughtful institutional design; a
well-designed deliberative setting can foster deliberation, indepen-
dently of the motives of participants.226 The second response is that
not only can the acquisition of new information, but the mere practice
of deliberation can also change participants’ preferences. This may
occur in part because when participants realize that certain prefer-
ences cannot be expressed in the form of acceptable or powerful
reasons, they may reevaluate those preferences.227
220. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 5.
221. The term “rationality” is central to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative
democracy. Habermas’s theory separates differing rationalities informing decision-
making; see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 50-54 (Thomas McCarthy, trans. 1984).
222. Peter McLaverty & Darren Halpin, Deliberative Drift: The Emergence of De-




226. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY, supra note 182, at 101-05.
227. Cohen, supra note 182, at 200-01.
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c. Deliberative property forms mirror the existing
distribution of power
The most radical objection to deliberative property forms is that
they may simply mirror the existing distribution of power. Demo-
cratic deliberative property forms may fail to involve, and may
actually exclude, potential participants, such as those least able to
participate on account of resources or education, those marginalized
on account of race, gender or sexuality, or those with ideologically
radical views. This objection is voiced with particular force by “differ-
ence democrats.” Difference democrats stress the need for democratic
politics to concern itself with “the recognition of the legitimacy and
validity of the particular perspectives of historically oppressed seg-
ments of the population.”228 Deliberative democracy, these critics
argue, is a revolutionary political idea. It calls for a radical change in
the bases of decision making as well as in the scope of those included
in decision making. To deliver its promises, deliberative democracy
requires dramatically more egalitarian political social and economic
conditions than exist in any contemporary society.229
In the obviously non-ideal circumstances of the real world, the
emancipatory potential of deliberative democracy may never be real-
ized. In the real world, decisions are always contingent and grounded
in power and it is delusional to present them as “reasoned argument
free form power.”230 For example, both the community land trust and
emphyteusis seek to facilitate a mode of urban planning that takes
the plurality and diversity of urban society as a point of departure.231
But the promise of community involvement, and especially minority
involvement, in deliberating over the terms of the emphyteutical deed
or the future of the land trust property may not materialize. The poor
and minority residents who live right next the proposed development
are less likely to be recruited to the deliberative table. Further, they
are likely to lack the ability to present their arguments in an effective
228. Dryzek, supra note 191, at 57. Among “difference democrats,” see WILLIAM
CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX
211 (1991) (envisioning an ideal situation where material inequalities have been rem-
edied and participants in democratic politics are prepared to question the
complexities and ambiguities of their own identities as well as those of others), Iris
Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DE-
MOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL, 120 (Seyla
Benhabib ed., 1996) (generally, critiquing deliberative democracy’s universalizing
tendencies that repress group difference and mask exclusion); Chantal Mouffe, De-
mocracy, Power and the Political, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 248-250
(arguing for a politics of difference that rejects any attempt to impose universal iden-
tities and rationalities).
229. Archon Fung, Deliberation Before the Revolution. Toward an Ethics of Deliber-
ative Democracy in an Unjust World, 33 POLITICAL THEORY 397, 397-398 (2005).
230. Andrew Knoops, Delivering Deliberation’s Emancipatory Potential, 34 POLITI-
CAL THEORY 594, 596 (2006).
231. Wigmans, supra note 111, at 217.
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manner and the power to push their views through to deliberative
process. The terms of the deed may end up reflecting the consensus
reached among the most powerful actors, the developer and the
municipality.
Difference democrats note that, not only is it delusional to pre-
sent the outcomes of deliberative democratic processes as inclusive
and free from power, it is also oppressive because it precludes more
radical and effective strategies for change. In other words, there is a
tension between activism and deliberative democracy. The activist is
suspicious of exhortations to deliberate. She recommends that those
who care about inclusion should engage primarily in “critical opposi-
tional activity,” rather than in reasoned arguments with those who
benefit from existing power structures.232
Can anything be done to enable deliberative property forms to
approximate the deliberative ideal? Deliberative democrats recognize
the force of these objections but argue that they do not justify aban-
doning deliberative democracy altogether. They suggest that
deliberative democracy has the capacity to question the background
conditions.233 When the process excludes particular groups or bene-
fits the most powerful, deliberation can bring this deficiency to public
attention. Thus, even under unjust conditions, deliberation can make
a more positive contribution to the elimination of injustice than other
alternative processes or strategies. Additionally, conditions for delib-
eration may be improved by incremental, non-revolutionary steps.
These include: affirmative action recruitment that targets disadvan-
taged groups, guarantees of consultation and veto power over
decisions that affect those groups.234 They may also include neutral
facilitators who provide information and training to the least able so
that they may voice their arguments effectively.235 Finally, delibera-
tion and activism are not mutually exclusive. Archon Fung has
proposed a convincing theory of “deliberative activism.”236 Fung ar-
gues that, under highly adverse conditions of extreme inequality, the
deliberative democrat should resort to non-deliberative, activist
methods. In Fung’s account, the deliberative democrat should be
faithful to the deliberative ideal until reasonable efforts to institute
fair and inclusive deliberation fail.237 The logic of Fung’s argument
parallels the justification for civil disobedience: the extent of the
deviation from deliberation increases according to the adversity of
232. Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POLITI-
CAL THEORY 670, 671 (2001).
233. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 182, at 42.
234. Fung, supra note 229, at 408; Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference:
A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 261-62 (1989).
235. Fung, supra note 229, at 413-14.
236. Id. (generally).
237. Id. at 402-03.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\62-2\COM203.txt unknown Seq: 50 18-FEB-14 8:34
350 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 62
circumstances. In other words, “just as it is morally incumbent upon
the civilly disobedient to make their cases through legal means before
violating the law, so those committed to deliberation should exhaust
deliberative means before resorting to non-communicative forms of
power.”238
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have provided an account of the numerus
clausus principle, how it works, why it exists, and the quality of the
forms on the list, that emphasizes democratic experimentalism. I
have expanded existing democratic accounts of the principle by focus-
ing on the role citizens and social movements play in generating new
property forms that are later ratified by the legislature. Further, I
have argued that a significant number of property forms created in
recent times share an important quality. They reflect an aspiration,
imperfectly realized, to deliberative democratic governance of re-
sources that involve public interests. I have examined
sympathetically, but critically, this new aspiration. This new theme
of deliberative democracy in property also raises further critical ques-
tions that are beyond the scope of this Article, most importantly, the
question of institutional design. To deliver their promises, delibera-
tive democratic property forms require making inclusive and
participatory governance a pragmatic reality, rather than an ideal,
and one that works. The promise of inclusion calls for processes that
identify all legitimate stakeholding interests and are effective at
recruiting diffuse, inarticulate and hard-to-represent groups. The
promise of reasoned deliberation requires mediation and facilitation
mechanisms able to trigger the “drift” toward a deliberative ethos in
unwilling participants and to remedy information asymmetries. The
promise of a continuing dialogue invites flexible procedures for regu-
lar reconsideration of decisions.
238. Id. at 403.
